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Notes
PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION FOR
INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES
Venture capitalism represents a significant source of capitalfor small and devel-
oping businesses, which in turn form the backbone of America's economy. The In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940, until its recent amendment by the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, imposed substantial limitations on the compensa-
tion packages which venture capitalists could offer to their portfolio managers. This
Note begins with an examination of the limitations imposed by the Act; it then exam-
ines proposed Rule 205-3, which the SEC intended to relieve the limitations, finall,
the Note examines the statutory reforms contained within the Small Business In vest-
ment Incentive Act of 1980.
INTRODUCTION
THE GROWTH of capital resources and the evolution of newbusiness and technology are lagging in the United States to-
day.' Critics of the American system blame this situation on the
regulation-or, perhaps, over-regulation--of the American busi-
ness community, and the economy as a whole, by federal and state
governments.2 The high cost of compliance with regulatory mech-
anisms is thought to reduce the ability of the economy to generate
capital,3 while at the same time increased governmental borrow-
1. The United States has had, since 1974, a "fairly dismal level of capital invest-
ment." CONG. Q., June 16, 1979, at 1156. Since 1966, nonresidential fixed investment has
been lower than other industrialized nations, id., and in 1979, the United States had signifi-
cantly lower rates of savings per capita than France, Germany, or Japan. Capital invest-
ment remained the lowest of any major nation.
2. See, e.g. ,A Special Section: Overregulation?, SATURDAY REviEw, Jan. 20, 1979, at
24; Federal Regulations: Catch-22for Business, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 22, 1979,
at 60; Note, The One-Two Combination: Will Federal and State Securities Regulation Knock
Out Small Business?, 14 TULSA L.J. 132 (1978).
Although this Note will be concerned primarily with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, and that agency's regulatory procedures, it is important to recognize that other
regulatory agencies and regulatory mechanisms also contribute to the problem; it is impos-
sible completely to isolate the effects of any one regulatory mechanism upon the system.
3. See, e.g., A Special Section: Overregulation?, supra note 2, at 24. For example,
compliance with pollution control regulations is expected to cost the steel industry over $4
billion between 1978 and 1985. Id. at 41. Industry as a whole will spend approximately
$96 billion to comply with regulations during fiscal year 1979. id. at 39. One study of the
effects of government regulation on the drug industry in the United States contrasted that
highly research-oriented production unit with its British counterpart and concluded that
COMPENSATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS
ing has eliminated significant sources of capital which might
otherwise have been available to stimulate economic growth.4 Es-
pecially hard hit5 are small and developing businesses,6 pivotal
elements in the nation's technological advance,7 which face pha-
lanxes of government regulators and massive barriers to necessary
capital funds.8
the decline in American innovation was due to government regulation, and that regulation
alone has caused the cost of a new pharmaceutical product in the United States to double
since 1962. Grabowski, Vernon & Thomas, Estimating the Effects of Regulation on Innova-
tion: An International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 21 J. L. &
ECON. 133, 159 (1978).
4. See Interview with Joseph Pechman, Dir. of Economic Studies, Brookings Inst.,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4, 1980, at 55, 56. There would be a $30 billion increase
in national savings by elimination of the present budget deficit. Id.
5. ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION OF THE DEPT. OF COMMERCE, THE
EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UPON INNOVATION BY
SMALL BUSINESSES, FINAL REPORT [hereinafter cited as SBA REPORT]. See U.S. SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N. ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, FINAL
REPORT, 511-46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT] (showing the
costs of disclosure for smaller firms to be grossly disproportional to those of larger firms).
6. "Small businesses" as used in this Note are those businesses which do not have
publicly traded securities and which have net-after-tax income, averaged over the past two
years, of $400,000 or less. This conforms to the definition used in rule 205-3; see note 124
infra. An alternative definition offered by the SEC is that the business have assets not
exceeding $9 million and a net worth not exceeding $4 million. Both definitions are de-
rived from one used by the Small Business Administration (SBA):
A small business concern. . . is one which: (a) together with its affiliates, is inde-
pendently owned and operated, is not dominant in its field of operation, does not
have assets exceeding $9 million, does not have net worth in excess of $4 million,
and does not have an average net income, after Federal income taxes, for the
preceding 2 years in excess of $400,000 (average net income to be computed with-
out benefit of any carryover loss) ...
13 C.F.R. § 121. 3-11 (1979).
7. Examination of the Effects of Rules and Regulations on the Ability of Small Busi-
nesses to Raise Capital and the Impact on Small Businesses of Disclosure Requirements
under the Securities Acts, Securities Act Release No. 5914 (March 6, 1978), reprinted in
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,530, at 80,150. Small businesses
provided nearly two-thirds of the new jobs created in America between 1970 and 1978 and
were credited with most of industry's scientific and technological development. SBA ANN.
REP. 3 (1978). One half of the most significant new industrial products and processes were
the result of work by firms having fewer than 1000 employees, and nearly one quarter of
such innovations were produced by firms having fewer than 100 employees. Small firms
were credited with being 24 times more productive of major research and developmental
innovations per dollar expended than larger firms. SBA REPORT, supra note 5, at 259.
The SBA points out that only 3 % of federal research and development dollars were
granted to small businesses, yet they produced 50% of the actual development. SBA ANN.
REP. 3 (1978).
8. SBA REPORT, supra note 5. The Report states:
The registration and reporting requirements of the SEC are prohibitively costly to
the small enterprise. In essence, the SEC is doing its job of preventing fraud by
preventing all types of small businesses-both good and bad-from access to
public markets. Large corporations can afford access to public capital markets
but small innovative firms are virtually excluded.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
In recognition of these difficulties facing small businesses and
the concern evinced by legislative9 and executive branch studies, l
many governmental units have adopted or recommended statu-
tory and regulatory changes in hopes of lowering the barriers to
development of small companies' and consequently increasing
technological advances and economic growth.'1 As part of this
pattern, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted
or proposed several regulations it believed would stimulate eco-
Id. at 263.' The SEC, however, is not solely to blame. The SBA has reported that:
There are glaring inequities in the tax system and in access to capital, from the
small business viewpoint. Small firms are almost entirely shut off from the public
securities market and all other sources of venture capital, and few of them could
borrow on long terms without help from the SBA. Banks naturally would rather
lend to big, well established businesses than to riskier small ones which lack col-
lateral. There is also less work and expense involved in making fewer loans for
larger amounts.
SBA ANN. REP. 4 (1978).
The SEC has confirmed that institutional investors and their advisers have little interest
in small companies. Most large investment units limit their interest to firms with a mini-
mum capitalization of $50 million. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 514.
Moreover, some institutional lenders are restrained by state or federal laws regarding "ap-
proved" investments. Id. at 516-18.
9. See, e.g., Hearings on Small Business Access to Equity and Venture Capital Before
the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on
Small Business, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); Hearings on the Economic Problems a/Small
Business Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Small
Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977); Hearings on the Overregulation of Small Business
Before the Subcomm. on Government Regulation ofthe Senate Select Comm. on Small Busi-
ness, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
10. See, e.g., SBA REPORT, supra note 5; U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
THE STUDY OF SMALL BUSINESS (1977); U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, REPORT
OF THE SBA TASK FORCE ON VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESS
(1977).
11. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1978 § 402(a), 26 I.R.C. § 1202 (1979)(increasing the
capital gains deduction from 50% to 60% was adopted in part to help small businesses
attract greater capital); S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1978). The SBA has
called for reductions in taxation on investors in small businesses, reduction in securities
regulation affecting investments in small businesses, and a reduction in the governmental
paperwork inflicted upon the small businessman. REPORT OF THE SBA TASK FORCE ON
VENTURE AND EQUITY CAPITAL FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 3 (1977); U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNMENT PAPERWORK AND SMALL BUSINESS: PROBLEMS AND SO-
LUTIONS (1979).
12. There are, of course, reasons other than governmental regulation for the absence
of investment leading to new capital. Some of these deterrents to new capital formation
are: 1) a shift from preference for investment to consumption, perhaps caused by the
higher prices of consumer goods during inflationary periods; 2) the failure of firms to de-
vise investment packages, using either internally generated or externally invested capital
assets, which prove attractive to investors by providing rate of adequate return for the risk
borne; and 3) an increase, perhaps due to a perception by investors of deteriorating global
economic conditions, in aversion to high risk investment opportunities. See Von Fur-
stenberg & Malkiel, The Government and Capital Formation: A Survey oRecent Issues, 15
J. ECON. LITERATURE 835 (1977).
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nomic development.13 One of these proposed regulations was rule
205-3,14 which was intended to significantly modify section 205 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.15
Section 205 prohibits the compensation of registered 16 invest-
13. The SEC amended Regulation A to increase the exemption from registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933 for small offerings of securities from $500,000 to
$1,500,000. Increase in Amount of Small Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No.
5977 (Sept. 11, 1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,710
(modifying Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (1979)).
The SEC also modified rule 146, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, and
thereby reduced the disclosure requirements for issues exempted from registration believ-
ing that this would induce an increase in new small business offerings. Private Placement
Exemptive Rule, Modification of Disclosure Requirements, Securities Act Release No.
5979 (Sept. 8, 1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,708
(modifying rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1979)). See SBA ANN. REP. 46 (1978).
Following hearings inspired by the pressures of legislative and executive branch studies
investigating obstacles to small business development, the SEC also adopted new reporting
procedures which simplify disclosure by small businesses. Simplified Registration and Re-
porting Requirements for Small Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6049 (April 3, 1979),
reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,046.
Finally, the SEC adopted rule 242, which allows certain corporate issuers to offer and to
sell up to $2,000,000 per issue of their securities to an unlimited number of institutional
investors, purchasers of minimum lots of $100,000 of the securities, the issuer's executive
officers and directors, and 35 other purchasers. Rule 242, 45 Fed. Reg. 6367 (1980)(to be
codified in 17 C.F.R. § 230.242).
These modifications of the status quo are not unopposed. SEC Commissioner Roberta
Karmel calls special exemptions for small businesses illogical:
The SEC's primary mandate is investor protection, and it is hard to conclude that
investors in small businesses need less protection or less information that [sic]
investors in big businesses. If government regulation of small businesses defeats
the objective of facilitating capital formation, so does that same regulation of big
business.
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 13, 1980, § F, at 1, col. 1. See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 511-12.
14. Rule 205-3, 44 Fed. Reg. 37473 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 275.205.3),
reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 156,351. The rule was announced in Performance-
Based Compensation of Registered Investment Advisers to Business Development Compa-
nies, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 680 (June 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Advis-
ers Act Release No. 680], reprinted in [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,113. Rule 205-3 was issued under the authority of § 206A of the Advisers Act:
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by order
upon application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person or
transaction, or any class or classes of persons, or transactions, from any provision
or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to
the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by
the policy and provisions of this subchapter.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6A (1976).
15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §§ 201-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to -21 (1976).
16. Registration is required of all investment advisers (except those specifically ex-
empted) by § 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976). The
exceptions to the registration requirements are for:
(I) any investment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the State within
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ment advisers 7 through the use of formulae based on the per-
formance of their clients' capital funds.' 8 With minor
which such investment adviser maintains his or its principal office afid place of
business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports with respect
to securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on any national se-
curities exchange;
(2) any investment adviser whose only clients are insurance companies; or
(3) any investment adviser who during the course of the preceding twelve
months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither holds himself out gen-
erally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser to
any investment company registered under subchapter I of this chapter.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (1976). Unless the invest-
ment adviser either registers or falls within one of the exceptions above, he or she is prohib-
ited from making use of the mails or any other means of interstate commerce in connection
with his or her business. Id. at § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1976).
17. An investment adviser is defined by § 202 of the Advisers Act to be:
[A]ny person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or
as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or
reports concerning securities; but does not include (A) a bank, or any bank hold-
ing company as defined in the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which is not
an investment company; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose
performance of such services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession;
(C) any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is solely incidental
to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special
compensation therefor; (D) the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news mag-
azine or business or financial publication of general and regular circulation; (E)
any person whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities other than
securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to principal
or interest by the United States, or securities issued by or guaranteed by corpora-
tions in which the United States has a direct or indirect interest which shall have
been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to section 78(c) (12) of
this title, as exempted securities for the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; or (F) such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the
Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)( 11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(1976). For a dis-
cussion of who qualifies as an adviser under this definition, see Lovitch, The Investment
Advisers Act of 1940- Who is an "InvestmentAdviser"?, 24 KAN. L. REV. 67 (1975); Note,
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Is a General Partner of a Limited Partnership an In-
vestment Adviser?, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 634 (1979).
18. Section 205 provides as follows:
No investment adviser, unless exempt from registration pursuant to section
80b-3(b) of this title, shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly, to enter into, extend, or renew any
investment advisory contract, or in any way to perform any investment advisory
contract entered into, extended, or renewed on or after November 1, 1940, if such
contract-
(1) provides for compensation to the investment adviser on the basis of a
share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any por-
tion of the funds of the client;
(2) fails to provide, in substance, that no assignment of such contract shall
be made by the investment adviser without the consent of the other party to
the contract; or
(3) fails to provide, in substance, that the investment adviser, if a partner-
ship, will notify the other party to the contract of any change in the member-
ship of such partnership within a reasonable time after such change.
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exceptions,' 9 investment advisers are forbidden to make any con-
tract through which they will receive compensation in proportion
to the performance of securities purchased by their clients. The
SEC, in rule 205-3, proposed to remove this prohibition from cer-
tain investment advisers and permit their compensation to be
based on capital performance.
The proposal extended only to investment advisers whose cli-
ents fell within the narrowly defined category of "business devel-
opment companies. '20  Business development companies-more
Paragraph (1) of this section shall not (A) be construed to prohibit an investment
advisory contract which provides for compensation based upon the total value of
a fund averaged over a definite period, or as of definite dates, or taken as of a
definite date, or (B) apply to an investment advisory contract with-
(i) an investment company registered under subchapter I of this chapter, or
(ii) any other person (except a trust, collective trust fund or separate account
referred to in section 80a-3(c)( 11) of this title), provided that the contract
relates to the investment of assets in excess of $1 million,
which contract provides for compensation based on the asset value of the com-
pany or fund under management averaged over a specified period and increasing
and decreasing proportionately with the investment performance of the company
or fund over a specified period in relation to the investment record of an appro-
priate index of securities prices or such other measure of investment performance
as the Commission by rule, regulation or order may specify. For purposes of
clause (B) of the preceding sentence, the point from which increases and decreases
in compensation are measured shall be the fee which is paid or earned when the
investment performance of such company or fund is equivalent to that of the
index or other measure of performance, and an index of securities prices shall be
deemed appropriate unless the Commission by order shall determine otherwise.
As used in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this section, "investment advisory contract"
means any contract or agreement whereby a person agrees to act as investment
adviser or to manage any investment or trading account of another person other
than an investment company registered under subehapter I of this chapter.
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976).
19. Id. For example, Adviser A, managing funds of Client C, who need not fit any
particular financial criteria, may receive compensation that charges a percentage of the
managed fund's value at any set period. Although the total compensation will vary as the
value of the fund fluctuates with the markets, the variation will not violate § 205. 2 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1410 (2d ed. 1961). Furthermore, a contract for compensa-
tion between the adviser and either an investment company as defined under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, (the companion piece of legislation to the Advisers Act), 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976)) or a single investor whose fund under management by the
adviser exceeds $1 million may allow for payments based on the performance of an in-
dependent standard of measurement.
20. Business development companies were defined in rule 205-3(b):
[b] Business development company. For purposes of this section, "business devel-
opment company" shall mean any company which
(1) is formed and operated primarily for the purpose of directly acquiring, in
transactions eligible for the exemption from registration provided by Section 4(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933, securities issued by eligible portfolio companies;
(2) Except as provided by paragraph (e) of this section, has all of its assets in-
vested in securities acquired directly from and issued by eligible portfolio compa-
nies;
(3) Beneficially owns at least five percent of all the voting securities (including
securities immediately convertible without restriction into voting securities at the
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commonly known as "venture capital companies" 2t-represent a
significant source of capital funding for new and evolving busi-
nesses and as such are an important segment of the community.22
Investment advisers to these organizations play an important role
in the direction and management of the business development
company's securities portfolio and, as a consequence, in the man-
agement of the companies in which the business development
option of, and without the payment of any additional consideration by, the holder
thereof) of each eligible portfolio company in which it has an investment: Pro-
vided however, that the foregoing condition shall be deemed to be satisfied if the
business development company's failure to own at least five percent of such secur-
ities results solely from the issuance of additional voting securities by the eligible
portfolio company subsequent to the initial investment therein by the business
development company;
(4) has issued all its outstanding securities (other than those issued to its officers,
directors or employees pursuant to a profit-sharing, stock option or stock
purchase plan)
(i) in transactions not involving any public offering of securities;
(ii) in transactions wherein the business development company, and any person
working on its behalf, shall have reasonable grounds to believe, and shall believe,
immediately prior to making any sale of securities of the business development
company, after making reasonable inquiry, either (A) that the purchaser has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment in the business de-
velopment company, or (B) that the purchaser and the purchaser's representa-
tive(s) together have such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment in the business development company and that the purchaser is able
to bear the economic risk of the investment;
(iii) to persons each of whom, prior to the sale of any securities of the business
development company to such persons, have access to, or are furnished with, all
material information reasonably necessary under the circumstances to enable
such persons to make an informed decision as to an investment in the business
development company; and
(iv) to persons, other than the investment adviser and persons associated with the
investment adviser, each of whom purchases, or agrees in writing to purchase,
securities of the business development company in a unit or units of at least
$150,000 which may not be fractionalized or otherwise divided, except as pro-
vided in paragraph (f) of this section, and which may not be sold, transferred or
otherwise disposed of, by the purchaser in a transaction or transactions involving
a public offering of securities, and such person may pay for such securities in
cash, or other tangible property, in a single payment of, or in installment pay-
ments in the aggregate amount of $150,000 or more (all deferred and installment
payments to be due within 12 months from the date of purchase of the securities
and evidenced and secured by a full recourse note or notes of the purchaser); and
(5) is not required to be registered as an investment company under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940.
Rule 205-3(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 37473 (1979) (to have been codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3),
reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,351, at 44,113.
21. The SEC prefers to use a more narrowly defined term for the purposes of this rule.
Advisers Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
22. For example, more than $170 million in new funds were raised by venture capital
firms in 1979, and $216 million raised in 1978. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1979,
at 75.
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company invests.23
The SEC recognized that section 205 of the Advisers Act in-
hibited the performance of business development companies since
it reduced the investment advisers' incentive to perform the addi-
tional services required by the special needs of business develop-
ment companies. 2 4  The investments made by business
development companies are highly speculative; the successful in-
vestor is richly rewarded, while the unsuccessful investor may lose
the entire investment.21 Yet the investment adviser to the success-
ful investor was not permitted to join in the benefits of the venture
which he suggested.26 The SEC found that this reduced the will-
ingness of investment advisers to assist business development
companies, resulting in turn in a reduction of the flow of capital to
small and developing companies.27
The SEC sought to correct this problem through the promul-
gation of rule 205-3, which would have allowed adviser compen-
sation contracts to be based on the performance of the managed
capital funds; it hoped thereby to increase the flow of capital into
small and developing companies28 through the lure of increased
compensation for investment advisers.
In addition to seeking an increase in the capital funding avail-
able for small and developing companies, the SEC had also to
uphold the primary purpose of the Advisers Act-the protection
of investors from sharp or unscrupulous practices on the part of
investment advisers.29 Rule 205-3's allowance of performance-
23. Most business development companies take the form of limited partnerships with
the general partner performing all major investment functions. This arguably implies that
the general partner is an investment adviser, see Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202,
supra note 17; Note, supra note 17; see also notes 48-72 infra and accompanying text.
24. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
25. Id.
26. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976), see text of
statute set forth at note 18 supra. Performance-based compensation is prohibited even
where advisers offer their clients rebates for fees collected on advice concerning deals that
went sour. 2 L. Loss, supra note 19; Robert Reinhart, Jr., SEC no-action letter (Sept. 21,
1971), reprintedin [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,464.
27. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926-27. It should be noted that
the SEC, through its allowance of performance-based compensation plans, seeks only to
cross the threshold of making advisers available to business development companies, and
not necessarily the advice given by any particular adviser. There is no evidence of a con-
nection between performance-based fees and superior investment performance. H. BINES,
LAW OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, 5-36 (1978).
28. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926-27.
29. Investment advisers are constrained from such practices by both the direct prohi-
bition against performance-based compensation contained in § 205 and the nature of the
investment adviser-investor-advisee relationship. The adviser is a fiduciary, required to
1980]
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based compensation could be justified only so long as adequate
protection existed for the investor-advisee.
Following the release of the proposed rule by the SEC in June
of 1979, it was roundly criticized by interested practitioners.30
The criticism was directed toward the probable ineffectiveness of
the rule in assisting the flow of capital to business development
companies and the inflexibility of the rule's limitations on portfo-
lio investment by the business development companies involved.
In October, 1980, Congress responded to the capital formation
problems of small and developing companies by enacting the
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. 1 The Act con-
tains numerous amendments to the securities laws; the changes in
the Advisers Act are intended to eliminate the problems created
by section 205's prohibition of performance-based compensa-
tion.32
This Note will examine the proposed rule and the 1980 Act in
light of the necessity of increasing the available capital for small
and developing companies while continuing to maintain the pro-
tective standards of the Advisers Act for investor-advisees. The
Note will initially discuss the existing environment of the business
development company and its investment advisers.33 Rule 205-3
will then be examined in terms of the effect it would have had
upon the ability of business development companies to supply
needed capital to small and developing companies,34 followed by
an analysis of the adequacy of protections extended to the inves-
tor-advisee by the rule.35 The Note suggests that, to increase the
effectiveness of the SEC's action, the rule should have been modi-
fied so that each adviser would have borne a positive burden of
serve the client with undivided loyalty. In re Kidder, Peabody & Co., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8425 (Oct. 16, 1968), reprinted in [1967-69 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,618. Thus, an adviser must fully disclose to the investor any adverse inter-
est the adviser may have and obtain the informed consent of the client. The adviser must
not deliberately assume a position so as not to be able to give the client the benefit of the
adviser's best advice and judgment. See Friedman, Problems Involving Investment Advisers
and Broker-Dealers Serving Individual Accounts, in FOURTH ANN. INST. ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 295, 295-96 (R. Mundeheim, A. Fleischer, J. Schupper ed. 1973).
30. E.g., letter from Cooley, Godward, Castro, Huddleson & Tatum to George A.
Fitzsimmons, Secretary of Securities and Exchange Commission, in response to Rule 205-3
(Sept. 14, 1979) (letter on file at office of Case Western Reserve Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Cooley, Godward letter].
31. PUB. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
32. See notes 188-228 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 40-82 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 83-145 infra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 146-87 infra and accompanying text.
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disclosure,36 each investor of a business development company
should have been able to bear the economic risk of investment,37
and the SEC's proposed alternative definition of portfolio com-
pany size should have been adopted.38 The Note then examines
the 1980 amendments to the Advisers Act and contrasts their ef-
fect with those of the proposed rule.39
I. BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES TODAY
Business development companies, as defined in both rule
205-340 and the amendment to the Advisers Act,4 are highly spe-
cialized, unique investment entities. Unlike the institutional in-
vestors-banks, savings and loans, and insurance com-
panies-which possess broadly based sources of investment capi-
tal and the ability to place funds in investments with varying risk
factors, and the mutual funds or ordinary investment companies,
which also have access to the funds of a host of investors and are
equally unrestricted in their consideration of risk when investing,
the rule limited business development companies to a small
number of very wealthy investors and may invest their capital
only in highly speculative securities of small and developing com-
panies.42 Although the 1980 amendments did not restrict the
number of investors, Congress did retain the high risk require-
ment.
Investment in business development companies has become
glamorous because of the possibility of investors attaining spectac-
ular profits from a minimal initial outlay.43 The strategy of these
companies is to place capital in small or struggling firms of low
36. See note 168 infra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 172-77 infra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 138-39 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 188-248 infra and accompanying text.
40. See note 20, supra.
41. See notes 188-89 infra and accompanying text.
42. Id. Whereas the ordinary investment company may have an unlimited number of
investors, the business development company is limited to no more than 100. Rule
205-3(b)(5), supra note 20, at 44,113-3. This section of the rule applies the Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1976), which excludes from the
definition of "investment company" any issuer of securities held by fewer than 100 persons
and which does not presently intend to make a public offering. The business development
company is really an investment company with limitations on participants and its ability to
invest in other than high-risk securities. It can thus be termed a "closed-end" investment'
company.
43. See WASSERSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW, 76-77 (1978); Rollinson, Venture
Capital, in THE VITAL MAJoIrrY: SMALL BusINESS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 183 (D.
Carson ed. 1974). The companies that are most likely to show spectacular profits are those
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present value, anticipating that these firms will develop into suc-
cessful businesses with a much higher value. The increase in the
value of securities of the company will provide the business devel-
opment company's profit when such securities are sold.
There is, however, no guarantee that the investments will
prove successful; failure is at least as probable as success. The
business development company's investors naturally hope that
their successes will more than offset the failures and, to achieve
this, seek to improve the management of the investment process.
The investment process may be described as the matching of
the risk and return preferences of the individual investors with the
risk and return factors involved in a given investment package."
Investors have individual perceptions of what constitute accepta-
ble levels of risk and what are acceptable rates of return for their
risk-taking. Proper management of this process involves locating
investment projects which will match these individual preferences
as closely as possible.
The investors in business development companies share one
common goal-high returns.45  While many venture capital
projects will involve a high risk factor, this is not a necessary attri-
bute of every business development company investment.46 The
prospect of high returns, however, is usually present.
Investors can increase the potential for higher returns from in-
vestment projects through two processes. First, the investor may
be able to locate securities which bear market prices below that
which the risk factor would indicate is proper. Second, the inves-
tor may aggregate diverse investments and by proper management
firms which inherently lend themselves to growth, such as industrial and manufacturing
firms. Id. at 188.
44. "Investment risk" is defined as "the variance of realized returns from expected
returns." Robinson, Small Business Investment and the Money and Capital/Markets, in THE
VITAL MAJORITY: SMALL BUSINESS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 39, 49 (D. Carson ed.
1974). As the variance decreases, the risk will also be reduced.
45. Although the common characteristic ascribed to most venture capital operations is
the highly speculative nature of the transaction, the investor is primarily interested in
achieving a very high return on an investment which will be realized over a period of time
through capital gains. See Rollinson, supra note 39, at 183. This will typically involve
taking risks greater than those taken by more conventional financing sources. Id. at 194.
46. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
The only circumstance in which the adviser will seriously pursue a low-risk project is
when the market incorrectly evaluates the new company and places too low a value upon
its securities. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. Such an undervaluation is likely to
occur on the securities of a small, privately held developing company because of the ab-
sence of efficient information exchange. Id.
[Vol. 30:676
COMPENSATION FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS
reduce the overall portfolio risk to a level below that which the
individual components would produce.
The possibility of an "undervalued" security suggests the exist-
ence of an inefficient securities market,4 7 where inadequate infor-
mation regarding individual securities results in investors
misperceiving the risk factor associated with such securities, and
hence paying either too much or too little for the investment.
When such a market exists, an investor must carefully analyze
each security for the accuracy of its market price. When the risk is
lower than the price warrants, there is an opportunity for a higher
return than ordinarily possible at the given risk level. Similarly,
an investor must take care to avoid overpayment and reduced
rates of return.
"Diversification" is the method of increasing rate of return
through aggregation of diverse securities. 48 Diversification seeks
to shelter the total investment by reducing the risk factor for the
entire portfolio. This is accomplished by investing in securities
whose values do not all behave similarly in reaction to identical
47. The inefficient market theory posits that market prices do not necessarily reflect
accurately all the information available about a company at any given moment. Inaccurate
valuations placed on securities by the marketplace, due to misinterpretations of available
data or failure to instantly and universally assimilate new data, allow securities to be priced
at a level either too high or too low for their true risk factor. This permits a higher (or
lower) return from a given security than would be possible if the evaluation of market
conditions accurately priced the security.
The obverse of the inefficient market theory is the efficient capital market theory. This
theory proceeds from the assumption that the market price of a security reflects all the
available information regarding the issue and does so instantaneously upon the release of
any new data. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at xxxiii. Under this theory,
no expert could discover an undervalued security, or if such a discovery were made, it
would immediately be assimilated by the market and built into the price. For a general
discussion of the efficient capital market theory, see id. at xxxi-xl; Note, The Efficient Capi-
tal Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29
STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
48. Spreading investments through numerous companies reduces the overall invest-
ment risk factor of the investment package. Investment risk - the variance of the realized
returns with the expected returns - is composed of two elements: the risk intrinsic to the
market system involved (systematic risk), and intrinsic to the specific investment (unsys-
tematic risk). Systematic risk may be illustrated by the returns of investors rising or falling
in tandem with the movement of the market in which the specific investment is found.
Unsystematic risk may be seen when a company fails in otherwise prosperous times or
expands in a period of business decline. Id. Theoretically, unsystematic risk (and hence
variance of returns) can be reduced by spreading investments through firms operating in
different competitive markets.
Systematic risk can be reduced through investments that remain detached from the
securities market as a whole. Experimental studies indicate that successful diversification
requires placement of capital in at least a dozen different securities. Id.
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economic stimuli.4 9 This would be accomplished, for example, by
investing in diverse industries or differing regions where the eco-
nomic factors affecting valuation would vary. This process is es-
pecially vital for business development companies where
individual securities in the portfolio may have a very high chance
of failure.
Diversification, however, is only one of the means used by
business developers to reduce overall investment risk; minimaliza-
tion of risk is also achieved through careful consideration of the
management of portfolio companies: the quality of the en-
trepreneurial abilities of the present firm management and the
quality of its product.50 These two components are critical to the
success or failure of the portfolio company. However, these are
difficult factors for the market as a whole to evaluate and may
contribute to the undervaluation of the company's securities.
Finally, minimalization of failure is achieved through active
participation of the business developers in the continued financing
and direct management of the portfolio company.5 Additional
capital investments, when needed, help ensure the survival of the
small company through temporary economic hardships, while ac-
tive participation in management may help solve temporary ad-
ministrative problems.
Thus, increasing the rate of return to the business development
company investors is a combination of locating undervalued se-
curities and high risk projects which, through proper management
of the selection process and of the portfolio companies themselves,
leads to a reduction in the aggregate risk. The result of a success-
49. Id. For a general discussion of diversification, see J. MOODY, PROFITABLE IN-
VESTING 24-34 (1925). Diversification is especially important because many of the invest-
ments made by the business development company are doomed to fail. See generally J.
DOMINGUEZ, VENTURE CAPITAL 19 (1974). Typically, of ten small firms starting opera-
tions, three will suffer substantial losses, three will achieve a break-even point, two will
show modest profits and two will reap profits sufficient to cover any losses. Id.
50. Id. at 13.
51. The author cites J. H. Whitney and Company as an example of this. Whitney, a
-noted venture capital firm founded shortly after World War II, divided its organization
into two parts: the investigation of new proposals and the rendering of advice and assist-
ance to the management of enterprises in which investments have been made. Each activ-
ity is regarded as equally critical to ultimate investment success. Managerial assistance is
provided until public sale of the portfolio securities is possible. Id. at 39-40. See also
Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14; BA Investment Management Corporation,
SEC no-action letter (March 28, 1978), reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $81,697.
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ful investment policy will be spectacular profits from minimal in-
vestor outlay.
Unfortunately, the individual investor in a business develop-
ment company may lack the expertise necessary for this undertak-
ing. Consequently, it is advantageous to both the investor and the
company to obtain the services of an able individual to perform
both the selection process and the follow-up managerial functions.
This managerial individual may be given the title of a general
partner in a limited partnership, a single general partner in a gen-
eral partnership, or merely a contractor or employee of the busi-
ness developers, but this individual's duties will be to locate and
investigate potential portfolio companies. He will examine all
known and discoverable information concerning the com-
pany-its present management, innovations, products, and indus-
trial setting-and evaluate the potential expected rate of return for
any investment to be made. He will then weigh this return against
the returns desired by the investment group. If the expected re-
turn equals or exceeds the return preferences of the investment
group, the investment should be made.
The person who serves the business development company in
this role is essentially performing the duties of an investment ad-
viser.52 Whether this person is an "adviser" within the meaning of
the Advisers Act and is required to register under section 203 of
the Act53 will determine whether he may receive performance-
based compensation, for under section 205, "investment advisers"
are barred from receiving any form of compensation which is
based on performance of the company's investments.54
Sadly, despite the forty year existence of the Advisers Act, no
clear determination of the scope of the registration requirements
under the Act has been set forth. While some advisers are
clearly included within the statute's reach-those who advise
more than fourteen individuals while using interstate means and
dealing with non-intrastate securities, 56 while some are clearly ex-
cluded-attorneys whose securities advice is only incidental to
52. If a person receives compensation in any form for managing the securities portfo-
lio and advising the purchase or sale of any securities the definition of an investment ad-
viser in § 202(a)(l 1) of the Advisers Act is applicable. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (1976). See
note 17 supra.
53. See note 16 supra.
54. See notes 18-19 supra.
55. Note, supra note'17, at 635; see Lovitch, supra note 17.
56. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1) (1976).
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their profession-7 a gray area exists in the registration require-
ments for others, such as general partners in limited partnerships
and advisers who are employees of a partnership with more than
fourteen partners. It is presently unclear whether a partnership
should be considered a single entity and, hence, a single client for
registration purposes or whether each limited or general partner
should be counted as a separate client.5" Since business develop-
ment companies are usually organized as partnerships, the ques-
tion is significant.
Before the passage of the 1980 amendments to the Advisers
Act, business development companies took three different ap-
proaches to this problem. First, the investors could limit their
numbers to fourteen or less, thereby falling within one of the clear
exemptions to the registration requirements (though this assumes
that the investment adviser limits any advice to this single group
of investors). 59 Second, the investors and their adviser could con-
strue their partnership as a single collective entity and a single
client, which placed them within the same statutory exemption.60
Third, the business development company could accept the con-
cept that each individual investor should be counted as an indi-
vidual client and refrain from paying performance-based
compensation to the adviser.61 The last alternative, however, was
rarely followed. 62
A. Limiting the Investors to Fourteen or Less
The first alternative, which limits the number of investors to
fourteen or less, poses a significant barrier to a business develop-
ment company's ability to attract large amounts of capital and
therefore limits the ability of a business development company to
57. Attorneys, engineers, teachers, and accountants who would otherwise fit the defi-
nition of an investment adviser are excluded from the Act's coverage if their advice comes
only during the course of their ordinary professional practice. Investment Advisers Act of
1940, § 202(a)(I 1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1976).
58. For example, the SEC recognizes hedge fund partnerships as distinct legal entities,
but indicates that if the managing partner organizes the partnership, each individual part-
ner is counted as an individual client. Ruth Levine, SEC no-action letter (December 15,
1976). Individual partners will be counted as clients so long as each pays compensation to
the managing partner. Id.; Hacker & Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private Investment
Partnershos After Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1476-79 (1978).
59. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(l) (1976).
60. Id.
61. This interpretation is an acknowledgment of the constraints imposed by § 205 of
the Advisers Act. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
62. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
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become a major source of investment capital. While the possibil-
ity that a small group of wealthy investors may collectively create
a substantial asset pool does exist, the comparative scarcity of
such individuals puts a practical limitation on this idea.
The SEC perceived the need for greater use of the business
development technique to promote growth in smaller and devel-
oping companies,63 yet this growth required an increase in the
capital investment in the company, which could be realistically
accomplished only by increasing the number of investors. This
realization did not mesh with the concept of a less-than-fifteen
member partnership.
Three factors preclude this form of registration-avoidance
from effectively satisfying the need for greater capital formation
for small company development. First of all, there is a paucity of
available investment advisers deemed acceptable to the inves-
tors.64 Consequently, business development companies have great
difficulty in finding capable individuals who are willing to assume
the responsibilities of managing both the security portfolio and
the companies invested in by the business development company.
The second factor which constrains the effectiveness of this al-
ternative is the potential limitation on the adviser's compensation
resulting from the small number of investors involved and their
relatively limited resources. Any expansion of the number of in-
vestors beyond those of the extremely wealthy, while maintaining
the less-than-fifteen per group format, must eventually signal the
decline in total value of the group's asset pool. This decline would
reduce the group's ability to pay the investment adviser a large
salary or to make use of the alternative compensation formulae
under section 205, which are keyed to the presence of a sufficiently
large asset base.65 Moreover, both of these methods of remunera-
tion tie the adviser's compensation to the current assets of the
business development company while prohibiting the use of the
prospect of high future earnings to attract the adviser's attention
to the investment group.
The third factor that restricts the effectiveness of the fewer-
than-fifteen format is directly related to the decline in asset pool
value caused by the limited number of extremely wealthy inves-
63. Id.
64. There were only 4,823 persons registered as investment advisers in 1977, an in-
crease of 781 in one year and 966 more than the total two years earlier. SEC ANN. REP.
234 (1977).
65. See note 19 supra.
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tors available for nascent groups. This relative decline in avail-
able capital will eventually cause groups to reach a point at which
insufficient capital will be available for adequate risk-reduction
through diversification.66 It will also force the situation where
groups will be unable to assist efficiently the growth of small and
developing companies which may require more capital than a sin-
gle investment group (or even a workable number of investment
groups) can generate. While it is not essential that any single de-
veloping company be helped by only one business development
company,67 there will be a practical limitation on how many
groups can work together on a single project, especially if active
management assistance of the portfolio companies is required.
These problems would not arise (or would be substantially di-
luted) if the investment group is allowed to have more than four-
teen members.68 This method of avoiding the limitations of the
Advisers Act is simply not conducive to fulfilling the needs of
small and developing companies.
B. Investors as a Collective Entity
Interpreting investor groups to be collective entities for the
purpose of investment adviser registration under section 203
removes the size limitations discussed in the previous section.
Prior to the 1980 amendments to the Advisers Act, this interpreta-
tion subjected the business development company and the adviser
to the risk of being parties to an illegal contract, should the inter-
pretation have later been held erroneous.69 If the SEC ruled
against the firm's interpretation and the adviser had been paid on
a performance basis, litigation over the compensation would have
66. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
It is essential that the companies which become part of the business development com-
pany's portfolio have a high probability of rapid growth and a resultant rapid gain. See
note 21, supra. Thus investment is limited to those sectors of the economy where rapidly
expansive growth is possible - manufacturing, research, and high-technology - but
where high initial capital input is required. With the need for diversification and a mini-
mum of 12 different companies to achieve a safe diversification level it is obvious that
business development groups with small amounts of investment capital are virtually impo-
tent.
67. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1979, at 76.
68. Under rule 205-3, up to 100 investors could have joined in a business develop-
ment company. See note 42 supra. This would have allowed at least 6 times as many
investors to join under one adviser as would be allowed using the less-than-fifteen excep-
tion.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976).
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been possible,7" and the adviser could have faced SEC discipli-
nary action.7" Despite these risks, many business development
companies pursued this course. Needless to say, the SEC did not
favor this practice.72
The 1980 amendments to the Advisers Act, however, have now
codified the concept of investor groups as collective entities for
adviser registration purposes. The limitation extends only to ad-
visers to business development companies, and does not protect
adviser-advisee relationships not involving business development
companies.73
C. Registration of the Adviser
Business development companies which do not avoid registra-
tion and the-effects of section 205 face a potential dilemma in that
they ask for and receive advisory services beyond those normally
provided by an "adviser," yet they are limited in the methods of
70. Section 215 of the Advisers Act voids any contract which is made in violation of
any section of the Act, including the no performance-based fees portion of § 205. Thus,
any compensation paid under such a contract may be invalid. The Supreme Court specifi-
cally recognized a right of recission by investor-advisees in Transamerica Mortgage Advis-
ers, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242, 249 (1979).
71. Section 209 of the Act empowers the SEC to enforce, by injunction, any section of
the Act and to bring any violation to the attention of the Attorney General for possible
prosecution. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976). Section 217 provides for criminal penalties of up to
a $10,000 fine, 5 years imprisonment, or both for willful violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-17 (1976).
72. The promulgation of rule 205-3 would have avoided this interpretation problem.
73. Section 202 of the 1980 Act provides:
Section 203(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)) is
amended by striking out the period at the end of the paragraph (3) and inserting
in lieu thereof the following: ", or a company which has elected to be a business
development company pursuant to section 54 of title I of this Act and has not
withdrawn its election. For purposes of determining the number of clients of an
investment adviser under this paragraph, no shareholder, partner, or beneficial
owner of a business development company, as defined in this title, shall be
deemed to be a client of such investment adviser unless such person is a client of
such investment adviser separate and apart from his status as a shareholder, part-
ner, or beneficial owner."
Id.
The amendment exempts from the Advisers Act registration provisions all advisers
serving Investment Company Act business development companies. See note 191 infra for
the Company Act's definition of "business development company." The amendment also
eliminates the uncertainty of investment advisers as to the status of partners, shareholders,
and beneficial owners of business development companies as defined in the Advisers Act.
See note 190 infra. Such persons are expressly excluded from the calculation of the
number of clients for purposes of activating the registration requirement. However, Con-
gress did not intend to clarify this issue for any other potential registrants. H.R. REP. No.
1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1980). Thus, for the typical investment adviser, the issue
remains unsettled.
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compensation open to them.7 4 The adviser acts much as an entre-
preneur guiding his own business would:75 actively selecting the
securities to be invested in, assisting the present management of
the firm in emergencies, and determining the timing of transac-
tions in securities. These functions partially explain the standard
structure of business development companies as partnerships with
the effective "adviser" serving either as the general partner of a
limited partnership or as one of the general partners of a general
partnership.
Because they hold these positions of control, advisers to busi-
ness development companies naturally expect their reward for ef-
fective management to be a greater return on their partnership
interest.7 6 In firms avoiding registration and the effects of section
205, there was no limitation on this return; in the case of advisers
who were subject to section 205, however, compensation could not
be related to the performance of securities. Therefore, the adviser
could not receive a "normal" partnership share based on sales of
securities held by the group. This restricted the form of compen-
sation available for such advisers to flat salaries or the alternative
fee arrangements of section 205.77 Neither proved sufficient in-
centive for capable advisers to increase their participation in busi-
ness development nor resulted in greater capital formation for
small and developing companies.
D. The SEC Response
The SEC was cognizant of 78 the problems of inadequate com-
pensation incentives for advisers to business development compa-
nies and of the limitations on normal partnership activity by
partners deemed to be advisers. On two occasions it granted ex-
emptions from section 205's prohibitions to business development
companies.79 These individual exemptions 80 were based on each
74. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1976).
75. Although specialists may be employed to perform any or all of the management
functions of an investment adviser, these functions are more commonly performed by the
general or managing partner of the business development company. See note 47 supra.
76. A common technique used in the partnership setting is an agreement for a greater
interest in the partnership earnings for the advising partner than would be proportionate
with the adviser's direct investment. See In re Weiss, Peck & Greer, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 623 (March 28, 1978), reprinted in 14 SEC DOCKET 640, 641.
77. See note 19 supra.
78. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81, 926-27.
79. In re Weiss, Peck & Greer, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 625 (April 25,
1978), reprinted in 14 SEC DOCKET 946; In re Foster Management Co., Investment Advis-
ers Act Release No. 651 (Nov. 28, 1978), reprinted in 16 SEC DOCKET 316. These exemp-
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firm's demonstration that its arrangement with the investment ad-
viser did not countermand the purpose of the Advisers Act but in
fact supported it.81 Each showed that the primary purpose of the
plan was to increase the capital available to small and developing
companies and that the compensation arrangement did not create
the possibility that the adviser would take unfair advantage of the
business development company. Subsequently, the SEC proposed
rule 205-382 which incorporated in rule form a general exemption
to section 205 similar to those granted individually.
II. RULE 205-3 AND THE PROMOTION OF CAPITAL
INVESTMENT IN SMALL AND DEVELOPING COMPANIES
The SEC proposed rule 205-3 in the belief that allowing advis-
ers to share in the gains earned by their investment group would
encourage activity in the market and attract more advisers and
business developers into the field. The increased interest in busi-
ness development would then increase the capital available to
small and developing companies. Whether the SEC was empow-
ered to do this within the confines of the Advisers Act and
whether this expected result was likely to occur are subjects to be
analyzed in this section of the Note.
A. The Advisers Act and the 1low of Capital
Although the primary purpose of the Advisers Act has been
identified as the protection of the public from fraud and other
misrepresentations by investment advisers,8 3 section 206A of the
Advisers Act 4 empowers the SEC to exempt any transaction from
tions were granted pursuant to the SEC's authority under § 206A of the Advisers Act, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6A (1976).
80. Two of the conditions present in the Weiss, Peck & Greer application which, to-
gether with other facts and circumstances, made the exemption appropriate were: (1) that
the limited partnership interests would be sold only to sophisticated investors and (2) that
the applicant itself would invest a minimum of $1 million in the enterprise. In re Weiss,
Peck & Greer, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 625 (April 25, 1978), reprinted in 14
SEC DOCKET 946.
The Foster Management Company asserted that its clients were sophisticated in a man-
ner similar to those of Weiss, Peck & Greer. Letter from Foster Management Company to
the SEC, (Oct. 25, 1978) at 25-26 (letter on file at office of Case Western Reserve Law
Review). It also held an ownership interest in the enterprise. Id. at 6-8.
81. See notes 146-51 infra and accompanying text.
82. See note 14 supra.
83. See H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6A (1976).
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the provisions of the Act "if and to the extent that such exemption
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest .. *"85 Conse-
quently, if the SEC determined that the encouragement of small
businesses is a strong public interest, it could lift the statutory or
regulatory procedures enacted in or under the Advisers Act to as-
sist these businesses.
Furthermore, the SEC's adoption of this proposed rule would
have been consistent with the legislative and executive branch
concerns over the role of the investment industry's "vital function
of stimulating the flow of capital into industry,"8 6 expressed at the
time of passage of the Investment Advisers and Investment Com-
pany Acts of 1940. Thus, through its exemptive power, the SEC
could attempt to provide additional equity capital for small and
developing companies, and thereby effectuate the recognized pur-
pose of the Advisers Act. The remainder of this section will ana-
lyze the proposed rule to determine whether it would have
achieved this end.
B. Directing the Flow of Capital by Definitions-"Business
Development Company"
The purpose of rule 205-3 was to facilitate the flow of capital
investment into small companies in the developmental stage.87 To
accomplish this goal, the SEC narrowly88 defined the term "busi-
ness development company" to exclude from the rule's coverage
many traditional venture capital activities that fail to respond di-
rectly to the need of small company investment capital.8 9 This
definition contained three important restrictions: first, the busi-
ness development company had to be "formed and operated pri-
marily for the purpose of directly acquiring" securities from small
and developing companies;9" second, the business developers had
to purchase at least a five percent voting interest in the small com-
pany (the portfolio company);9' and, third, the individual inves-
85. Id.
86. 86 CONG. REc. 9807 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Cole).
87. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14 at 81, 927.
88. See note 20 supra.
89. Some venture capitalists have participated in funding large companies which have
access to banks or to the public through conventional securities markets. These companies
may come to venture capitalists when conventional sources of capital are hard to find,
during recessionary periods, or when the individual project under consideration exceeds
the available capital.
90. Rule 205-3(b)(1), supra note 20, at 44,113.
91. Rule 205-3(b)(3), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
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tors had to have a minimum investment in the business
development company of $150,000. 9 2 Each restriction bore on the
business development company's potential to alleviate the capital
shortage which confronts small businesses.
1. Operation Primari ,for Direct Acquisition of Small Company
Securities
Since direct acquisition of securities from portfolio companies
is the heart of venture capitalism's ability to raise capital needed
by small firms, business development companies which seek to op-
erate under rule 205-3 had to be "formed and operatedprimarily
for the purpose of directly acquiring" 93 portfolio securities of
small and developing companies. Such direct investment of eq-
uity dollars into small firms serves as an alternative to conven-
tional lenders and investors. 94 At the same time, the acquisition of
securities in small companies with high growth potential satisfies
the investors' desire for long-term, potentially lucrative opportuni-
ties. The proposed rule, therefore, aimed at those investment
groups which adhere to this behavioral pattern. When the busi-
ness development company no longer engaged primarily in the
acquistion of small company securities, it ceased to serve the pur-
pose of the rule and lost the benefits of the exemption.
When the investors are no longer primarily concerned about
working with small and developing companies, it is appropriate to
remove a rule 205-3 type exemption. Such a situation arises, for
example, if the business development company has been so suc-
cessful in nurturing the small companies in which it invested to
prosperous maturity, that the investors decide to rest on their lau-
rels. When this occurs, the company will no longer have the char-
acter of a business development company, having become instead
a form of holding company. The business development flavor of
the investment company might also be lost if the investors decide
that their investment preferences95 have changed and begin to in-
vest in mature companies which would not qualify as "small and
92. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(iv), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
93. Rule 205-3(b)(1), supra note 20, at 44,113 (emphasis added).
94. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
95. A change in the risk-preferences of the investors can occur on either a vertical or
horizontal level. If there is a basic change in the level of risk they wish to take, it is consid-
ered a vertical change. An illustration of this would be an investment in a mature com-
pany, such as IBM or General Motors, which has a lower level of overall risk. A horizontal
change, in which the same level of risk is maintained but the preference for the specific
investment is changed, would arise from a switch from present small company securities to
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developing" under rule 205-3.96 Although this may in fact benefit
the larger company, in that it makes available capital which might
otherwise be unobtainable from conventional sources, the invest-
ment in mature companies was not the objective of rule 205-3.
Investment in mature companies does not involve the same ex-
treme risk as that in small and developing companies because in-
formation concerning the performance and nature of these larger,
more -established organizations is more available. In addition,
management in mature companies usually does not need the ac-
tive assistance of investment advisers and business developers.97
Thus, despite the fact that investments in larger, more mature
firms may result in innovation, jobs, and other positive elements,
any business development company which makes such invest-
ments would lose its exemption from section 205.
Rule 205-3's exemption might be explained as an attempt to
offset the low value placed on securities of small and developing
companies in the marketplace. It provided incentives for those in-
vestment groups which seek to invest in companies whose securi-
ties are undesirable to the average investor because of insufficient
information on their expected performance. 98 Lack of informa-
tion on expected performance increases the risk factor of the indi-
vidual company, yet, a major goal of the business development
company and its investment adviser is the reduction of these risk
factors.99 Thus, in order to produce the positive effects of rule
205-3-the increase of available capital for small companies-the
investment development company must be able to attract knowl-
edgeable investment advisers and reduce the risk. It can be ar-
gued that any potential dangers stemming from the establishment
of the rule should have been tolerated only so long as the offset-
ting gains of capital formation for small companies were assured.
Under this rationale, the effects of the "operating primarily" lan-
guage seems correct.
Rule 205-3 also required that the business development com-
pany always be "operated primarily" for direct acquisitions of eli-
gible portfolio company securities. This posed a problem in that it
reduced the investors' flexibility in making investment decisions.
an equally risky choice in another investment sector. Hypothetically, this investment could
be in a large, publicly traded company such as Chrysler Corporation.
96. See notes 129-39 infra and accompanying text.
97. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text.
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Their investments must fit the description of "portfolio securities"
at all times,"° or their company would not be able to pay per-
formance-based compensation-an event which would raise spe-
cial problems in the typical partnership situation where the
investment adviser is a partner expecting a partner's share of any
capital gains. However, problems would arise in any form of or-
ganization which paid performance-based compensation since the
investment adviser would no longer be entitled to this type of
compensation.
Consequently, so long as the investors permitted their invest-
ment adviser to receive performance-based compensation under
rule 205-3's exemption, they were limited in their choice of invest-
ment strategies. They lost the ability to consolidate their position
in a portfolio company by purchasing securities after the company
goes public.' 0 ' They had to divest securities of successfully
developed firms if continued retention would be viewed as chang-
ing the character of the business development company. They
had to always be "primarily" investing directly in small compa-
nies. 102
Although "primarily" was not precisely defined by the SEC,
the informational release containing the proposed rule stated that:
a business development company which had a substantial por-
tion of its assets invested in large, publicly traded companies
would no longer be operating "primarily" for the purpose of
directly acquiring securities of eligible portfolio companies, and
therefore the company would cease to qualify as a business de-
velopment company under paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed
rule. - o
3
Since the SEC recognized that this definiton might be sufficiently
vague to allow payment of performance-based fees where business
development companies held many mature securities, it offered an
alternative to the "primarily" concept that would require the busi-
ness development company to sell or otherwise dispose of any se-
curity held for ten years."°  The SEC also proposed a
100. Paragraph (e) of rule 205-3 would have allowed the business development com-
pany to maintain limited holdings in interim assets - cash or money-market instruments
with a term of one year or less - "[pirovided, that such business development company
intends, and reasonably anticipates, to invest or reinvest such assets in securities of eligible
portfolio companies." Rule 205-3(e), 44 Fed. Reg. 37474 (1979) (to have been codified at
17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(e)) reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,351, at 44,113-4.
101. See Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,930.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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modification of the rule that would permit the business develop-
ment company to invest up to ten percent of its portfolio in other-
wise ineligible securities.' 0 The use of this ten percent limitation
may indicate that a similar figure would have been used to limit
the concept of "primarily."
A serious problem which resulted from the inflexibility of the
rule's restrictions on eligible securities was a potential for conflict
of interest for the investment adviser. The adviser, who may have
entered into the entire transaction solely because of the perform-
ance-based incentives allowed under rule 205-3,106 could retain
these additional benefits only as long as the company remained
within the "primarily" operating restriction of the rule. It is possi-
ble, however, that the time would have come when it would have
been disadvantageous for the investment group to maintain its sta-
tus as a business development company. It may be that the securi-
ties would have matured and yielded such satisfactory gains that
investors would wish to end the speculation process and hold on
to their current positions. However, the adviser might be influ-
enced by the prospect of continued performance-based compensa-
tion to oppose such a move and encourage continued speculation.
This conflict might have caused the adviser to misrepresent the
actual position of the investments or the investment market to per-
suade the investors to continue as before. Such a result would
have been completely contrary to the goals of the Advisers Act,"0 7
which was intended to protect the investor against the "frauds and
misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts."' If the
proposed rule failed to prevent such conflicts of interest, then it
would no longer have been appropriately promulgated under sec-
tion 206A, which permits the SEC to grant exemptions from the
Advisers Act only where "... consistent with the protection of
investors." 0 9
Fortunately, the proposed rule contained safeguards against
such results. It required the adviser to own an active, significant
105. Id. The Commission requested comment on this alternative proposal. When this
10% exemption is coupled with the already existing allowance of paragraph (e) of the rule,
see note 95 supra, the investment adviser in the business development company is allowed
considerable flexibility to include within the diversification scheme investments in portfolio
securities with less risk than the typical small company security. At the same time, there is
little reduction of the potential increase in small business capitalization.
106. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
108. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6A (1976).
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interest in the business development company. 110 This require-
ment, consistent with the pattern established in the two earlier
grants of exemption from section 205,111 reduced the untoward
effects of performance-based compensation incentives on the ad-
viser. If the adviser should have chosen to continue speculative
investments and selected projects which decrease the asset pool,
his own interest in that pool would have been reduced and there
would have been no performance-based compensation. If, on the
other hand, the advisor guided the business development com-
pany successfully, he would indeed benefit, but so would the other
investors whose interests would also increase. Hence, the problem
created by the adviser's self-interest as a compensated employee
was mitigated by his self-interest as an investor.
Another safeguard against an investment adviser making a
self-interested decision to continue speculation was that each in-
vestor in the business development company was required to have
a level of sophistication concerning investment" 2 which would
have made it unlikely for that investor not to realize his own best
interests. Should the adviser attempt to continue speculation once
success had been achieved, the knowledgeable investor might eas-
ily have chosen to terminate involvement with the group. Since
the investments of the past had been successful, liquidation of this
interest would not have been difficult." 3
It must be noted that the investment adviser's self-interest
alone should not be condemned as its presence lay at the very root
of the proposed rule. The appeal of the business development
field for these advisers was simply the performance-based com-
pensation.' 14 Correspondingly, it was hoped that this exemption
would aid the formation of more business development compa-
nies, thereby increasing capital in the small business sector of the
economy. Effectively understood and controlled, the concept of
self-interest, then, could be used to help solve one of the econ-
omy's pressing problems. This self-interested decisionmaking was
only a violation of section 206A when harm to the advisees re-
sulted. However, this was not likely under this section of the rule.
110. See notes 178-82 infra and accompanying text.
111. See note 79 supra.
112. See notes 159-63 infra and accompanying text.
113. This is not true of the investor's interest in general; usually the high-risk factor of
the investment in the business development company severely limits the prospective pur-
chasers of such interests. When the business development company hasachieved signifi-
cant success, however, liquidity will increase.
114. See notes 24-28 supra and accompanying text.
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Thus, insofar as the principle that the business development com-
pany had to be "operated primarily" for direct acquisition of se-
curities channeled the flow of capital into small and developing
companies and protected against an adviser's abuse of his posi-
tion, it met the rationale for the proposed rule and the require-
ments of section 206A.
2. Requirement of a Minimum Investment in a Portfolio
Company's Securities
In order to qualify for the exemption of rule 205-3, a business
development company had to own a minimum of five percent of
the voting securities of each company in which it invested." 5 This
requirement was derived from the SEC's understanding that the
typical venture capital company investing in small and developing
companies owned a sufficiently large portion of the portfolio com-
panies to enable it to take an active role, through its investment
adviser, in the management of such portfolio companies." 6 The
Commission believed such control to be a part of the justification
for the payment of performance-based compensation under the
proposed rule.
This five percent rule, however, limited a business develop-
ment company's ability to spread its capital through enough com-
panies to ensure proper diversification of the portfolio.' ' Since a
company may need as many as twelve different security invest-
ments to ensure the proper diversification and risk-reduction de-
sired by its investors, 18 any requirement of a minimum
investment would affect the freedom with which investment advis-
ers could place funds with different companies.
Moreover, there are circumstances where an adviser might
have found it desirable, in the absence of this provision, to make
an investment below the five percent requirement. For example,
two business development companies might collaborate in a joint
effort with a single portfolio company." 9 In such a case, it might
be unnecessary for both companies to hold a large interest in the
portfolio company, as one could rely on the other to protect both
investment companies through active management participation.
The potential return on even a small investment might be attrac-
115. Rule 205-3(b)(3), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
116. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,927.
117. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1979, at 76.
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tive, and much-needed capital would be supplied to a small com-
pany. Nonetheless, the SEC precluded this sort of cooperative
venture by its minimum investment requirement.
Still, this restriction did not unduly hamper the ability of a
business development company to assist in the development of
small companies, or to reduce its overall portfolio risk through
diversification. The small size of eligible portfolio companies,
coupled with the typically large asset pool of a business develop-
ment company, made any undue burdens on investment unlikely.
Most business development companies would have been able to
meet the five percent requirement in any company which was eli-
gible for investment under the definition of "portfolio company."
Furthermore, the five percent minimum advanced the ration-
ale for rule 205-3's special treatment of business development
company investment advisers-the unique managerial functions
of the investment adviser. Since the adviser had to manage both
the asset pool and, on occasion, the portfolio company itself, the
business development company needed some power to control the
portfolio company, 120 either through an agreement as part of the
original funding arrangement or, more typically, through ongoing
voting power in the portfolio company's management. Five per-
cent ownership may have, in fact, been too low to ensure this con-
trol, rather than too high. The standard appears to have been less
a talisman for actual investment by any business development
company than a floor below which it was difficult to demonstrate
sufficient managerial control' to justify performance-based com-
pensation.
3. Minimum Investment Requirement for Individual Investors
The third factor in the SEC's definition of "business develop-,
ment company" potentially affecting the amount of capital avail-
able to small and developing companies was the requirement that
each investor of the business development company make a mini-
120. Obviously, this power can be derived from means other than voting control. The
business development company could, for example, lend money to the small firm with
conditions attached that would give the lenders some control over the borrower's activities.
However, larger venture capitalists - those more likely to have the assets to fulfill the need
for significant new capital resources for small businesses - are more likely to use equity
financing than straight debt methods of investment. J. DOMINQUEZ, supra note 49, at
20-21 (1974). Large venture capitalists favor this method of investment because of their
reliance on a high degree of managerial skill in both their investments and the manage-
ments of the portfolio companies. Id. at 21.
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mum initial investment of $150,000.121 While this limitation, on
the surface, appeared to reduce the ability to raise additional capi-
tal from those investors who were either unable'22 or unwilling to
risk so large an initial investment, an examination of the limita-
tion in light of the needs of portfolio companies and the policy of
the Adviser's Act shows that the ability of business development
companies to increase small company capitalization was not un-
duly limited.
The amount of funding necessary to establish a sound business
development company is substantial.2 3  Diversification for risk-
reduction requires the ability to spread investments over several
portfolio companies, while the five percent minimum investment
rule imposed a minimum entry level for investment. Each of
these factors increased the amount of capital necessary for the
business development company's internal operations.
More generally, the need for increased flow of capital to small
and developing companies required a substantial base of new
financial resources. The previous exemptions from section 205
went to firms with sizable asset pools' 24--the type of business de-
velopment groups which the SEC sought to promote. Groups of
investors with less than $150,000 per individual may not have had
a sufficiently large asset pool to play a significant role in small
company capitalization.125 Thus, they were properly excluded
121. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(iv), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
122. To the extent that a person is unable to invest $150,000 in the business develop-
ment company, the person may be unable to bear the financial risk of any investment in
such a venture. This raises the issue of whether such a person should be permitted to invest
in such a hazardous investment. See notes 169-77 infra and accompanying text.
123. For example, it was the experience of one law firm commenting on the proposed
rule that a single client firm required five separate funding transactions during its evolution
into a Fortune 1000 company listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The financings
involved $1.6 million, $4.5 million, $800,000, $3.4 million, and $14 million, respectively.
Cooley, Godward letter, supra note 30.
124. The fund involved in the Weiss, Peck & Greer application was initially expected
to be capitalized in the $20-$40 million range. In re Weiss, Peck & Greer, Investment
Advisers Release No. 623 (March 28, 1978) reprinted in 14 SEC DOCKEr 640. The Foster
Management application involved funds of approximately $10 million. Letter from Foster
Management Company to the SEC, supra note 80, at 25-26.
125. This takes into consideration the restriction imposed by rule 205-3(bX5) on the
potential numbers of investors in the business development company. See note 38 supra.
Since the group is unable to exceed 100 individuals, efficient risk-spreading requires that
each investor contribute more capital to the fund than would be necessary if its numbers
were unlimited. Moreover, since the important consideration in diversification schemes is
not the individual asset pool of the investors, but the size of the group asset pool, it can be
argued that it is unimportant whether the asset pool is made up of many small investors
and a few very wealthy individuals or of investors all of whom meet the $150,000 mini-
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from the rule's definition because they did not fulfill its purpose.
Finally, the $150,000 minimum investment requirement repre-
sented an effort to ensure the continued protection of the investor,
by lifting the prohibitions of section 205 only where sufficiently
sophisticated investors were involved.'26 Thus, the minimum in-
vestment requirement served both purposes of a section 206A ex-
emption: it protected investors while promoting a special public
interest-the contribution of new capital to small and developing
companies. 27
C. Directing the Flow of Capital by Dofnitions-"Eligible
Portfolio Company"
In order to further ensure that rule 205-3 would be used only
by those advisers and investors who actively invest in small and
developing companies, the SEC narrowly defined the category of
portfolio companies in which a business development company
could invest.'28 Under the proposed rule, the "eligible portfolio
company"'2 9 had to meet three criteria: (1) the company must
have had an average annual income over the two year period pre-
mum. However, this argument does not take into account the protective safeguards of the
minimum investment requirement. See notes 169-77 infra.
126. Id.
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6A (1976).
128. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,929-30.
129. The small companies in which the business development company can invest were
defined in the rule:
(c) Eilgibleporfolio company. For the purposes of this section, an "eligible port-
folio company" shall mean any company which -
(1) At the time of the initial investment therein by a business development
company-
(i) Did not have an average annual net income, after Federal income taxes, for
the immediately preceding two fiscal years in excess of $400,000 (average annual
net income to be computed without the benefit of any loss carryover);
(ii) Is not making and has not made a public offering of its securities;
(iii) Is not subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
(iv) Is not an investment company as defined in Section 3 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940: Provided, That the sole basis therefor is not the exclusion
set forth in Section 3(c)(l) of such Act.(2) At the time of each additional investment therein by the business develop-
ment company - (i) Satisfies all of the conditions described in paragraphs
(c)(l)(ii)(iii) and (iv) of this section, and
(ii) Has not previously issued to the business development company any se-
curities which have been sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, by such com-
pany, except for securities converted into, or exchanged for, other securities of the
eligible portfolio company.
Rule 205-3(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 37474 (1979) (to have been codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.205-3(c)), reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 156,351, at 44,113-3.
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ceding the initial investment which was less than $400,000130 (An
SEC alternative proposal was to restrict eligibility to portfolio
companies with net worth of $4 million and total assets of $9 mil-
lion); 31 (2) the portfolio company could not have previously
made a public offering of its securities; 132 (3) the portfolio com-
pany could not be an "investment company" as defined in the In-
vestment Company Act. 3 3 Each of these factors served to limit
the effects of rule 205-3 to investments in those small and devel-
oping companies which were perceived by the SEC and other reg-
ulatory agencies to be in need of assistance.
1. Restrictions on Portfolio Company Size
The most effective assurance that the ultimate beneficiaries of
this rule would be the small and developing companies which re-
quired increased capital was the size limitation of eligible portfo-
lio companies. Rule 205-3 required that the portfolio company be
a firm which, in the two years preceding the initial business devel-
opment company investment, had an average annual net income
of less than $400,000. 14 The rule did not prohibit additional in-
vestments of capital in the small company after it exceeded the
initial income limitations'35 and therefore did not limit active
assistance of the portfolio company after the initial contact.
However, the SEC's exclusive reliance on income in defining
portfolio company size may have raised potential difficulties.
Such a definition ignored the possible deflection of capital from
small companies to larger ones which were not the intended recip-
ients of the rule's benefits. A larger company, which had suffered
two consecutive years of low profits, would fit the definition as
proposed, assuming that it was neither publicly held nor an invest-
ment company.' 36 Yet this firm might have been able to seek cap-
ital effectively from alternative markets-such as conventional
lenders-because of its large net worth or net asset pool. It, how-
ever, would not have been the type of company for which the SEC
130. Rule 205-3(c)(1)(i), supra note 124, at 44,113-3.
131. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,929-30.
132. Rule 205-3(c)(1)(ii), supra note 124, at 44,113-4.
133. Rule 205-3(c)(1)(iv), supra note 124, at 44,113-4.
134. Rule 205-3(c)(1)(i), supra note 124, at 44,113-3. This limitation is derived from
the Small Business Administration's definition of a "small business concern." Advisers Act
Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,929-30.
135. Id. at 81,930.
136. These were requirements of rule 205-3(c)(1)(i), supra note 124, and rule
205-3(c)(1)(iv), supra note 124, respectively.
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perceived a special need for business development company
assistance. 137 Thus, the present definition of "eligible portfolio
company" was overbroad.
The SEC suggested an alternative definition, 138 which based
the eligiblity of a portfolio company on its net worth and total
asset value. Net worth could not exceed $4 million, and total asset
value could not exceed $9 million. 139 Reliance on these standards,
rather than net income, would have eliminated the possiblity of a
large firm taking advantage of the rule. Only if a large firm's asset
pool had been reduced would it be able to fit into the eligible cate-
gory. Thus, the alternative definition more closely followed the
aim of the SEC to facilitate the increased capitalization of small
companies, and should, therefore, have been adopted in lieu of
that originally proposed.
2. Restriction to Privately Held Companies
The definition of an eligible portfolio company precluded con-
current or previous public offerings of the small company's securi-
ties.140 This restriction was not unprecedented - venture capital
companies have traditionally dealt with privately-held firms
which lack access to the capital available in the public securities
markets. 141
Nevertheless, it must be recognized that some small companies
have made public offerings and would have been denied the bene-
fits of rule 205-3. Moreover, it is likely that their securities would
have a low present value due to the high-risk level associated with
the typical portfolio company investment of business development
companies.' 42 The SEC, however, believed that these publicly
traded firms should not be included in the business development
company's prospective investments. It was argued that despite the
low present value of the securities, the publicly traded firms could
seek investor interest, and hence capital, through means fore-
closed to the privately held firms which were the target of rule
205-3.143 Although there might have been individual cases of
137. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
138. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,929-30. This standard is also
based on the SBA's definition of "small business concerns."
139. Id.
140. Rule 205-3(c)(I)(ii), supra note 124, at 44,113-4.
141. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,926.
142. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
143. The publicly traded company has access to the public securities markets and
therefore is more visible to experts other than investment advisers to business development
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publicly traded firms disadvantaged by this restriction, it carried
forward venture capital's established predisposition for private
companies, and would not have substantially impaired investment
in small companies.
3. Restriction on Investment in Investment Companies
The SEC's concern for small businesses in their developmental
stages which are unable to obtain financing from public and insti-
tutional financial markets did not extend to investment groups,
except to the extent that those groups foster capital investment in
small and developing companies. It was not surprising, therefore,
that the rule prohibited investment of business development com-
pany assets in the securities of other investment companies. 44
Permitting this type of investment would not have directly in-
creased the capital available to any of the SEC's target small com-
panies. Even if the portfolio investment company used its assets
to capitalize small businesses, it would only have been acting as an
intermediary for funds which the original business development
company could have provided directly. This would also have re-
duced the active control of the business development company's
investment adviser over investment management and obviated the
basis for the adviser's exemption from section 205.
Permitting another investment intermediary to have portfolio
company status might also have led to an evasion of rule 205-3
restrictions by both the investment adviser and the investing busi-
ness development company. The investors of the business devel-
opment company could have organized a second "portfolio"
investment company which would not have conformed to rule
205-3 standards for investment companies, but which the invest-
ment adviser could have managed while continuing to receive per-
formance-based compensation from the parent. Although the
"portfolio" investment company might have technically con-
formed to the size requirements of the rule, 45 and therefore be a
"small" business, it was obviously not the type of business which
the SEC wanted to provide with increased capital flow. The pro-
hibition against portfolio company status for another investment
companies. This visibility ought to reduce the perceived risks of the firm which in turn
may increase the possibilities for attracting investors. See note 46 supra.
144. This provision extends to hedge funds or other business development companies,
which are excluded from coverage by the Investment Company Act only by the effects of
§ 3(c)(1) of that Act. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra note 14, at 81,929.
145. See notes 130-31 supra and accompanying text.
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company was an attempt to avoid such abuse of the exemption
and to maintain the small business capitalization function of the
rule.
Thus, it appears that rule 205-3 did adequately consider and
control the loopholes existing in its exemption from section 205 of
the Advisers Act for those business development companies and
advisers who would facilitate the flow of capital to small and de-
veloping companies. It remains to be determined whether the rule
provided adequate protection for the investor-advisees, which was
the intent of the Advisers Act and the specific requirement of sec-
tion 206A.
III. THE CONTINUING PROTECTION OF INVESTORS
The essential purpose of the Investment Advisers Act, and
hence any regulation promulgated under its authority, is "to pro-
tect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of unscru-
pulous tipsters and touts .... ,,146 The Act makes such
maneuvers by investment advisers illegal,147 requires advisers in-
volved in interstate commerce to register with the SEC, 48 and em-
powers the Commission to deny registry (and hence legal status)
to any person convicted of felonies involving the sale of securi-
ties 149 or other willful violations of the various securities laws. 150
Section 205 of the Advisers Act, intended to discourage undue
risk-taking by investment advisers, until the 1980 amendments,
prohibited contracts between advisers and advisees under which
the adviser received performance-based compensation.' 5 1 Rule
205-3, however, flew in the face of this strong congressional prohi-
bition against compensation plans which give rise to adviser ma-
nipulation of investor-advisee assets for selfish gain. Thus, the
rule was appropriate only if safeguards were established that
would provide the investor-advisee with adequate protection
aganst wild speculation by the adviser. 152
To accomplish this protection, the SEC adopted five condi-
tions which had to be satisfied before rule 205-3's exemption
146. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 28 (1940); S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 21 (1940).
147. 86 CONG. REC. 9809 (remarks of Rep. Cole).
148. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2) (1976).
150. Id. at-§ 203(e)(4).
151. See note 18 supra.
152. Such protection is specifically required by § 206A of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6A (1976).
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would operate: (1) the investors in the business development com-
pany had to meet a test of knowledgeability;5 3 (2) the investor
had to have access to material investment information; 5 4 (3) the
investor had to make a minimum investment of $150,000 in the
business development company. 5 5 Each of these three safeguards
had to exist at the time the investor entered into the investment
group; the presence or absence of an investment adviser at that
time was immaterial;5 6 (4) the investment adviser was required,
upon his entry into a performance-based fee contract, to have an
investment interest similar to that of the investor-advisee, thereby
acquiring an actual stake in the venture beyond the advisory
fee; 57 (5) the advisory fee had to be calculated by a formula in-
cluding losses as well as gains.' 8 In this section of the Note, each
safeguard will be examined in turn.
A. Knowledgeability of the Investors
The proposed regulation, requiring the investors in the busi-
ness development company to meet a knowledgeability test, pro-
hibited the company from issuing its securities to any purchaser
whom it did not have "reasonable grounds to believe, and shall
believe. . . has such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investment in the business development
company."'' 5 9 If the individual investor lacked this level of know-
ledgeability, the rule permitted an evaluation of both the potential
153. Rule 205-3(b), supra note 20, at 44,113.
154. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(iii), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
155. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(iv), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
156. Rule 205-3(a) did not extend its exemption to existing venture capital groups un-
less every member of the group - past and present - met the definitional requirements.
Rule 205-3(a), supra note 20, at 44,113.
157. Rule 205-3(d)(1), infra note 178, at 44,113-4.
158. Rule 205-3(d)(2), infra note 183, at 44,113-4.
159. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(ii), supra note 20, at 44,113-3. This standard of knowledgeabil-
ity was also used in rule 146 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(2), mak-
ing interpretations of rule 146 relevant to rule 205-3. Advisers Act Release No. 680, supra
note 14, at 81,928. The burden of determining knowledgeability will fall on both the in-
vestment adviser and the business development company promoters. The adviser must
make an independent appraisal of the investors' knowledgeability because it is the adviser
who is expressly forbidden under § 205 from entering into a contract with a performance-
based fee. The investment sponsors must also have reasonable grounds for believing inves-
tors are knowledgeable. Furthermore, if they plan to employ the services of an investment
adviser at a date following the initial formation of the business development company, the
requirements of the proposed rule must be met at the time of the initial securities sale or
distribution.
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investor and the representative to be made for this knowledgeabil-
ity, provided that the investor was "able to bear the economic risk
of the investment." 16
0
This required knowledgeability concerning the risks of invest-
ment in the business development company included, by implica-
tion, the ability to judge the value of the company's investment
adviser, yet there never have been criteria by which the SEC or
other regulatory bodies measure adviser competence. 16' Although
proposals have been made for the establishment of training or
quality standards, none has been enacted.' 62 Consequently, eval-
uation of the investment adviser's competence remained the inves-
tor's responsibility.
Knowledgeability provided the investor with a safeguard
against the behavior of the investment adviser in that the investor
could judge independently (or with assistance of a representative)
the business development company's risk level and determine its
relationship to the investor's own risk-preference.
63
B. Investor Access to Material Information
Rule 205-3 required that the business development company
issue its securities only to investors who ". . . have access to, or
are furnished with, all material information reasonably necessary
under the circumstances to enable such persons to make an in-
formed decision as to an investment in the business development
company."' This portion of the rule was clearly designed to pro-
tect the investor from blindly risking his capital in the investment
group. It was a necessary adjunct to the requirement of know-
ledgeability, since even those investors who were generally knowl-
edgeable about investment strategy and market conditions were
incapable of making sound, independent judgments of the quality
of an investment about which they were ignorant. This concept
was consistent with the general securities law policy of promoting
160. Rule 205-3(b)(4)(ii), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
161. Ahart, Advising the Individual Investor: Comparing the Federal Regulation of In-
vestment Advisers, Banks, and Broker-Dealers, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 31, 76 (1978).
162. Id. at 77-80. See Legislative Proposals Concerning Regulation ofInvestment Advis-
ers, 332 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-5 (Dec. 17, 1975), in which the SEC asked
Congress for authority to promulgate standards. An objective of these financial responsi-
bility rules would be to ensure the existence of the investment adviser to provide the requi-
site continuity for long-range investment advising. Id.
163. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
164. Rule 205-3(b), supra note 20, at 44,113.
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an informed investment public;1 65 disclosure, rather than close
regulation, is the preferred procedure.
The rule did not state precisely what "material information"
had to be available or provided to the investor-an ambiguity
which followed the SEC's view that "materiality" is a non-quanti-
fiable concept, judgmental in nature and impossible to translate
into numerical formulae. 166 The investor and business develop-
ment company had to rely on past interpretations of "material-
ity' 67 rather than on standards delineated by the rule. In this
respect, the business development investor was in the same posi-
tion as any other investor.
The proposed rule may be criticized for its failure to impose a
complete burden of disclosure upon the business development
company and its investment adviser. The SEC could have re-
quired that all material information be provided to the investor;
instead it had divided the burden, requiring the investor to ac-
quire that information which was accessible. This safeguard was
weaker than a requirement that the investor be provided with all
material information, and since rule 205-3 benefited the invest-
ment adviser as well as small businesses, it would seem appropri-
ate to have placed any additional burdens arising from the need to
protect the investor upon the adviser rather than the investor. The
165. The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recommended that the SEC
adopt the following statement of objectives:
The Commission's function in the corporate disclosure system is to assure the
public availability in an efficient and reasonable manner and on a timely basis of
reliable, firm-oriented information material to informed investment, and corpo-
rate suffrage decision-making. The Commission should not adopt disclosure re-
quirements which have as their principal objective the regulation of corporate
conduct.
ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at D-9.
166. Cf. Blackstone,A4 Roadmapfor Disclosure vs. a Blueprintfor Fraud, 26 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 74, 79 (1978) (discussing disclosure under the Securities and Securities Exchange
Acts). In response to the idea of setting up materiality guidelines for disclosure by public
companies, the SEC staff concluded that detailed guidelines are not feasible and that spe-
cific rules tend to become a blueprint for fraud. Id. at 74.
167. The materiality concept effectively limits the amount of information which must
be disclosed to investors under the securities laws. Some information is obviously needed
to allow the investor to make an informed investment decision. "Full disclosure," how-
ever, is not truly possible due to the prohibitively high costs in time and expense for the
discloser and the unmanageable task of the investor actually digesting the material. Hew-
itt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW 887, 892 (1977).
The definition of "material" is not fixed; it is a matter of case-by-case analysis. How-
ever, the standard against which factual circumstances are tested for "materiality" was es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438
(1976): "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
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Commission, then, should have required that the investors be pro-
vided with all material information reasonably necessary to make
an informed decision.
This proposal would have withstood both cost reduction and
cost allocation analysis. 68 The cost of each investor individually
obtaining the requisite information to make a knowledgeable
judgment regarding the investment would always exceed the cost
of the adviser gathering the information and providing it to the
investors, regardless of whether the business development com-
pany was in its organizational phase or had matured. In the orga-
nizational period, each investor would need approximately the
same amount of information (for example, the prospective risk
factors of the investment packages and the abilities of the invest-
ment adviser). This information should have been provided, not
merely made accessible. At a later point in the company's devel-
opment, the adviser would be the most informed individual and
independent investigation would be more costly, and less likely to
find all the facts, than consultation with a competent adviser.
Placing the full burden upon the adviser would have made any
subsequent investigation into the completeness of available mate-
rial information easier, while reducing the cost of informing the
investor and enforcing the regulation. Under the rule as proposed
by the SEC, the factfinder in any action in which the knowledge-
ability of the investor was significant would have been forced to
look at the information which was provided as well as the infor-
mation which was accessible-an inquiry which would have in-
volved determining boundaries for the concept of "accessibility."
Under the proposed modification, however, the factfinder need
only have examined the information provided to determine its ad-
equacy.
The requirement that the investor be informed stemmed from
the release of the investment adviser from the prohibitions of sec-
tion 205. Although it was hoped that the ultimate benefit of the
exemption would fall upon small and developing businesses, the
initial benefits would have been felt by investment advisers who
would receive compensation exceeding that previously allowed. It
would have been appropriate, then, to place any added costs re-
168. Cost reduction analysis is based on the concept that the preferred form of regula-
tion is that which bears the lowest cost to the system as a whole. If Regulation X will cost,
for a single transaction, $10,000 to the company, $50,000 to the investor, and $50,000 to the
government, it is less attractive than Regulation Y, which will cost the company $80,000
without direct costs to the others.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
suiting from this exemption upon the direct beneficiary, as under a
cost allocation theory. Such an allocation-requiring the investor
to be informed at the cost of the adviser-would have contributed
to the safeguards against abuse of the rule 205-3 exemption.
C. The Investor's Minimum Investment
Rule 205-3 required purchasers of an interest in business de-
velopment companies to invest at least $150,000 (paid either at the
time of initial purchase or within twelve months of that time). 169
This served as a crude safeguard against risk mismatch by the in-
vestor, and was based on the dubious presumption that persons
with $150,000 to invest were seeking (and were appropriate inves-
tors in) the high-risk securities to which the investment adviser
would commit the business development company's funds. 70 In-
dependent wealth was also presumed to indicate the ability either
to make an independent investment decision or to employ capable
representatives,' 7 ' and thus increase the likelihood that the inves-
tor would be able to preserve his or her position even in the face
of managerial abuse by the adviser. Yet, the language of the pro-
posed rule did not guarantee investor affluence. While required to
make a $150,000 investment, the ability of the investor to bear the
economic risk 172 involved in the venture was not necessarily ap-
parent; this investment may have been the investor's only asset,
169. Rule 205-3(b), supra note 20, at 44,113.
170. Minimum wealth level does not indicate the ability to perceive the risk of invest-
ment, nor does it accurately identify the risk level at which a person should be investing.
For example, an investor with a present net worth of many millions of dollars, but without
any current income sources, should be concentrating his or her investments on current
income production, not high-risk securities.
The minimum wealth standards of rule 205-3 would have failed to protect an investor
against such a mismatched risk in a situation where the investment adviser or the business
development company was actively involved, through the sale of the company's securities,
in promoting the mismatch.
It must be recalled, however, that the wealth requirement did not operate in a vacuum,
but only as a correlative requirement to that of knowledgeability. Under rule 205-3, the
investor must have been either self-knowledgeable or have had the services of a personal
representative who provided the requisite knowledgeability. See notes 159-63 supra and
accompanying text. Therefore, an investor had to have the ability to determine personally
the appropriate risk level at which investments were made. Thus, in conjunction with
knowledgeability requirements, minimum wealth requirements limited the entry of inves-
tors who truly lacked the ability to cushion themselves against loss. See notes 159-60 supra
and accompanying text.
171. Employing a representative was permitted, see note 20 supra.
172. "Economic risk," as used in (b)(4)(ii), was an additional standard to be met by
those investors who were not personally knowledgeable. See note 20 supra. The SEC,
however, did not define the standard to be used in testing the ability to bear economic risk.
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leaving no reserve should the investment fail. This possibility viti-
ates the presumption that an investor's sizeable investment always
indicates some extra independent judgmental capability regarding
the investment, and therefore weakened the value of this safe-
guard against adviser abuse of the exemption from section 205.
This weakness was accentuated by the failure of the rule to
prohibit leveraging' 73 by the investor. Under the rule, it was pos-
sible for the knowledgeable investor to raise $150,000 by borrow-
ing against other assets, including such basic assets as a home or
life insurance policy. A subsequent collapse of the investment
could have resulted in permanent economic harm to the investor
relying upon such basic equity.
It is not the customary duty of the SEC to protect investors
against the rash mistakes or miscalculations which may be the rea-
son for the loss to the leveraged or otherwise undercapitalized in-
vestor. It is possible, however, that an adviser's abuse of the
exemption from section 205 may have caused such a loss by acting
in the wildly speculative way which initially led to the adoption of
section 205.'74 Thus, the proposed rule could have led to signifi-
cant economic injury to an investor-a result repugnant to section
206A. Because of this possibility, the SEC should have changed
the requirements of minimum investment assets to require that all
investors be able to bear the economic risk of the investment with-
out leveraging and overstretching personal assets.
It should also be noted that some investors were already pro-
tected by this proposed modification; those investors who did not
meet the self-knowledgeable test must have been able to bear the
economic risk of their investment decision, leaving only those in-
dividuals who were deemed self-knowledgeable to suffer the con-
sequences of overstretching their personal asset pool. 75 Even
though it was not obvious how this differentiation would aid addi-
tional capital formation for small companies, the SEC failed to
offer an explanation. 176
173. Leveraging is "the use of borrowed capital to increase the profitability of the eq-
uity, or shareholder's interest." H. HOAGLAND & L. STONE, REAL ESTATE FINANCING 118
(1973).
174. See note 146 supra.
175. These people are apparently excluded from the requirement of being able to "bear
the economic risk" by virtue of their acknowledged independent ability to judge the risks
involved. Any mismatched risk which takes place results from their own choice, rather
than through outside influences.
176. Even if there were some small incremental increase in capital formation due to the
proposed language, this would not in itself satisfy § 206A's requirement that the investor be
1980]
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At the time the Advisers Act was enacted, Congress expressed
some concern for those investors who were not truly wealthy.' 77 If
there was to be a distinction in the regulatory scheme between
those who are wealthy and those who are not, it would seem ap-
propriate to have given any additional protection to the less afflu-
ent. The rule's effect, however, was in diametric opposition to this
goal; it should have been modified to require that all investors be
able to bear the economic risk of their investment.
D. The Adviser's Minimum Investment
The requirement that the investment adviser purchase and
maintain an investment of at least $150,00078 acted as another
protection against misuse of the managerial position. This re-
quirement significantly altered the relationship of the adviser to
the advisee, as the investment adviser could no longer escape from
poor investment unscathed; he would now suffer losses as well as
enjoy gains. Furthermore, the requirement that the adviser have
no less of an investment than one percent of the cash and other
tangible property invested by the other investors forced his equity
position to increase along with the other investors. This should
have inhibited wild speculation.'
7 9
protected. Protection of the investor-advisee, not capital formation, is the primary purpose
of the Advisers Act. See notes 146-52 supra and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., 86 CONG. REC. 9814 (1940) (remarks of Rep. Hinshaw) ("If a rich man
loses through bad advice that is too bad, but if a widow or a minor or a man in very modest
circumstances loses that is a tragedy, and its magnitude is inversely proportional to the
wealth of the loser.").
178. Rule 205-3(d)(1) provided:
(1) The investment adviser, and persons associated with the investment ad-
viser, shall at all times beneficially own, by reason of having purchased for cash
or other tangible property (which shall have been received by the business devel-
opment company), securities (other than senior securities as defined in Section
18(g) of the Investment Company Act of 1940) of such business development
company (i) in a unit or units of at least $150,000 which may not be fractionalized
or otherwise divided, except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, and
which may not be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, by the investment
adviser, or persons associated with the investment adviser, in a transaction or
transactions involving a public offering of securities and (ii) in an amount not less
than the greater of: (A) One percent of the aggregate amount of the cash and
other tangible property invested (or agreed to be invested) in the business devel-
opment company by all other persons who have purchased (or have agreed in
writing to purchase) securities of such business development company; or (B)
$150,000.
44 Fed. Reg. 37474 (1979)(to have been codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(I)), reprinted
in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,351, at 44,113-4.
179. The inhibition, however, will exist only so long as the adviser perceives a mean-
ingful stake at risk in the venture. This may not be the case if the compensation arrange-
ment (including any performance-based aspect) has allowed recoupment of the original
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It should be noted that this provision was a significant modifi-
cation of the Investment Advisers Act, as the Act does not contain
any financial responsibility requirements for advisers. 180  Al-
though the SEC has asked Congress to promulgate standards for
financial responsibility, this has not yet been done. However, the
SEC believes that such standards are essential, arguing that "a
primary objective of any financial responsibility requirement
under the Advisers Act would be the existence of the investment
adviser as a going concern to provide the requisite continuity to
long-range investment planning."s1 8  So, the requirement that ad-
visers operating under rule 205-3 maintain a stake in the venture
was designed to ensure this continuity of advice and control over
investment planning. Continuity is especially crucial for business
development companies, which rely upon their adviser to manage
both their long-term investments and the portfolio companies
when necessary.
The weakness in the proposal lay in its potential impact upon
younger and less financially secure investment advisers. The min-
imum investment requirement might have excluded them from
working with business development companies operating under
rule 205-3, since their inability to raise the required investment
funds would make them ineligible. While this hardship might
have been mitigated by allowing them, within the bounds of the
rule as written and the modified language suggested in the previ-
ous section,'8 2 to leverage their investment with borrowed funds,
this would not have eliminated the problem. Moreover, the signif-
icant protection to all the investors which resulted from the ad-
viser's minimum investment was simply too important a safeguard
against adviser abuse of rule 205-3 to eliminate, even for the less
wealthy advisers.
investment so there are no longer any personal funds at risk. This would occur, for exam-
ple, if the advisory contract provided for a fixed first year compensation of the full amount
placed at risk by the adviser. However, if the initial investment group insists upon limita-
tions on any early compensation of the adviser which would remove the adviser's personal-
ized stake in the venture, some protection against this scenario might be accorded. Such a
scheme, however, is dependent on the investors first perceiving the problem and then hav-
ing the power to make and enforce contractual limitations.
180. Ahart, supra note 161, at 76.
181. Legislative Proposals Concerning Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note
162, at E-5.
182. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
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E. Calculation of the Adviser's Compensation
The proposed rule required that any performance-based com-
pensation paid to an adviser be determined by netting the gains
against all realized and unrealized losses.' 83 The fee could be cal-
culated on the basis of actually realized gains 84 or of realized and
unrealized gains; 85 in either case, however, all losses, realized or
not, had to be counted. 86 Thus, sale of a highly successful secur-
ity providing large capital gain to the company asset pool would
be offset for compensation purposes by any losses in securities
presently held by the business development company. Conse-
quently, the adviser could not manipulate his compensation by
selling successful securities while "hiding" unsuccessful invest-
ments. The rule required that the value of the retained securities
be ascertained through an independent appraisal. This method of
calculation ensured that the adviser would not receive compensa-
tion for gain on one security if such gains insufficiently offset ex-
isting losses.
These procedures did not preclude the possibility of perform-
183. Rule 205-3(d) provided:
(2) Any computation of net capital gains or net capital appreciation for pur-
poses of determining compensation of a type described in paragraph (a) of this
section shall be made net of all realized capital losses and unrealized capital losses
and unrealized capital losses (capital depreciation) of the business development
company during the period for which the computation is made; and
(3) Any compensation paid pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section shall be
based on a written valuation of the business development company's assets which
is prepared or reviewed by a qualified independent appraiser (i) who is not (A) a
person associated with the investment adviser or (B) a person otherwise providing
services to the investment adviser, pursuant to any agreement or understanding,
and (ii) who certifies in writing to the business development company that the
valuation is fair and reasonable.
44 Fed. Reg. 37474 (1979) (to have been codified at 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(2), reprinted
in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 56,351, at 44,113-4.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. For example, suppose the business development company in which the investment
adviser has a performance-based compensation contract has twelve different securities.
Suppose further, that it sells two of this group at a net capital gain of $200,000 and one at a
net capital loss of $10,000. Finally, suppose that of the nine other holdings, three have
appraised valuations above their purchase price totalling $50,000, three have neither
gained nor lost value, and three have lost value totalling $200,000. In calculating the ad-
viser's compensation, the company could either count only the realized gains or count both
the realized and the unrealized gains. The former totals $200,000; the latter totals $250,000.
If losses could be ignored, these values would form the basis of the consideration. If only
realized losses were offset, the compensation would be calculated on $190,000 or $240,000,
respectively.
However, the rule required calculation of all losses, realized and unrealized. Thus, the
$200,000 paper losses must be offset as well, reducing the basis for compensation to either a
negative factor of $10,000 or a positive value of $40,000.
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ance-based compensation being paid in one year, based on suc-
cessful growth in the investments held, while events in the next
year cause the investments to decline in value. Although this was
a risk which is faced in designing any compensation plan, it did
not significantly weaken the safeguards against adviser abuses.
When combined with the other safeguards-knowledgeability, ac-
cess to information required for informed decisionmaking, mini-
mum investor investments, and minimum adviser
standards 87 -the netting process appeared to provide adequate
assurances against investment adviser abuse of rule 205-3's ex-
emption.
IV. THE SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT INCENTIVE ACT OF
1980
Congress has responded to the need for capital formation in
business with its enactment of the Small Business Investment In-
centive Act of 1980.188 The Act contains three amendments to the
Advisers Act'89 which, in effect, permit the payment of perform-
ance-based compensation to investment advisers of business de-
velopment companies. This section of the Note will examine and
contrast the statutory changes with those discussed earlier with re-
gard to rule 205-3.
A. The Promotion of Capital Investment in Small and
Developing Companies
In circumscribing the availability of performance-based com-
pensation, Congress, like the SEC, has adopted a definitional ap-
proach. The terms "business development company" and
"eligible portfolio company" are defined so as to allow such com-
pensation only for the advisers of those investment groups which
directly facilitate the capital formation of small, developing com-
panies. Congress's definitions, however, are far less restrictive
187. See notes 159-82 supra and accompanying text.
188. Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
189. First, Congress added § 202(a)(22) to the Advisers Act, defining "business devel-
opment company." Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 201, 94 Stat. 2289 (1980) (to be codified in 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(22)).
Second, Congress amended § 203(b)(3), exempting investment advisers to certain busi-
ness development companies from registration. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 202, 94 Stat. 2290
(1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3)).
Third, Congress exempted any adviser to a business development company from
§ 205's prohibition against performance-based compensation. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 203,
94 Stat. 2290 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5).
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than those employed by the SEC, and result in a far broader class
of eligible portfolio investments.
1. "Business Development Company"
The Advisers Act now contains a definition of "business devel-
opment company" in section 202(a)(22). 19 ° This definition is de-
rived from the new definition of a business development company
contained in the Investment Company Act, 19' but differs from that
contained in its sister act in three respects: it removes the require-
ment that the business development company be a closed-end in-
vestment company that has elected to be covered by the newly-
enacted sections 55 through 65 of the Investment Company Act, it
decreases the required percentage of investments in qualifying
portfolio securities from seventy percent to sixty percent, and it
permits the acquisition of securities from any person, rather than
from issuers and affiliates alone.
190. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 201, 94 Stat. 2289 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(22)). The definition provides:
"Business development company" means any company which is a business
development company as defined in section 2(a)(48) of title I of this Act and
which complies with section 55 of title I of this Act, except that -
(A) the 70 per centum of the value of the total assets condition referred to in
sections 2(a)(48) and 55 of title I of this Act shall be 60 per centum for purposes of
determining compliance therewith;
(B) such company need not be a closed-end company and need not elect to be
subject to the provisions of sections 55 through 65 of title I of this Act; and
(C) the securities which may be purchased pursuant to section 55(a) of title I
of this Act may be purchased from any person. For purposes of this paragraph,
all terms in section 2(a)(48) and 55 of title I of this Act shall have the same mean-
ing set forth in such title as if such company were a registered closed-end invest-
ment company, except that the value of the assets of a business development
company which is not subject to the provisions of sections 55 through 65 of title I
of this Act shall be determined as of the date of the most recent financial state-
ments which it furnished to all holders of its securities and shall be determined no
less than annually.
Id.
191. Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.
80a-3(a)(48)). The definition provides:
"Business development company" means any closed-end company which -
(A) is organized under the laws of, and has its principal place of business in,
any State or States;
(B) is operated for the purpose of making investments in securities described
in sections 55(a)(1) through (3), and makes available significant managerial assist-
ance with respect to the issuers of such securities, provided that a business devel-
opment company must make available significant managerial assistance only with
respect to the companies which are treated by such business development com-
pany as satisfying the 70 per centum of the value of its total assets condition of
section 55; and
(C) has elected pursuant to section 54(a) to be subject to the provisions of
sections 55 through 65.
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Unlike the definition of business development company found
in rule 205-3, Congress's definition does not require the company
to be formed and operated "primarily for the purpose of directly
acquiring" securities of small and developing companies. 192 In-
stead, the investment group must maintain a minimum of sixty
percent of its total assets in qualifying securities, which need not
be purchased directly from the issuer.'93 This less stringent stan-
dard, coupled with the statute's expansive definition of qualifying
securities, gives the business development company's portfolio
managers a tremendous increase in flexibility in their selection of
investments.
First, the business development company no longer must ac-
quire its securities directly from the issuer.'9 4 Under rule 205-3, a
secondary market purchase of otherwise eligible portfolio com-
pany securities would not have been counted toward the "oper-
ated primarily" requirement. Congress's action will have the
beneficial effect of allowing business development companies to
purchase securities held by the founders and initial investors in
small companies, thereby permitting business developers to take
over the effective control and management of a small company
without requiring the issuance of new securities. Such a result was
not possible under rule 205-3 and could have stymied some busi-
ness development investments. 95
However, removal of the rule's requirement of primary market
acquisitions may result in the loss of a principal benefit sought by
both the SEC 196 and Congress' 97 -increased capital formation for
192. See notes 93-114 supra and accompanying text.
193. See notes 191-92 supra for text of statute.
194. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
195. One commentator on rule 205-3 had observed:
The requirement [of direct acquisitions] would preclude an opportunity to
purchase securities from existing investors in an otherwise eligible portfolio com-
pany. Thus, a leveraged buyout of a subsidiary or division of a company which
seeks or is forced, e.g. by a Federal Trade Commission decree, to get out of a
particular business (when management is capable but without sufficient resources
to fund the divestiture) would be precluded. The proposed rule would also pre-
clude the purchase of the securities of a family-owned and managed business
(e.g., where the principal may want to retire or is deceased), the purchase of secur-
ities held by a pension fund investor where continued illiquidity of the company's
securities may require disposition because of ERISA, or the purchase of securities
held by founders of a company which cannot or does not want to go public and
where continued illiquidity of the founders' securities acts as a significant impedi-
ment to development of the company's business.
Cooley, Godward letter, supra note 30, at 6-7.
196. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
197. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980).
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
small business. Under the statute, it is theoretically possible for
performance-based compensation to be paid to the adviser of a
business development company which deals solely in the secon-
dary market, and invests no new capital in portfolio companies.19
8
Presumably, Congress believes that managerial assistance alone is
a vital need of developing companies.
Second, the business development company is no longer faced
with the uncertainty of the "operated primarily" language of rule
205-3.199 The statute instead imposes a clear, and quite liberal,
quantitative standard for minimum investment in qualifying se-
curities.2" The sixty percent floor is far lower than that which the
SEC would have permitted under the rule;20 1 in conjunction with
the statute's broader definition of "eligible portfolio company,"
the Act's forty percent "window"202 allows the business develop-
ment company's management tremendous freedom in managing
the portfolio.20 3
This increased freedom suppresses one of the potential hazards
of rule 205-3-that the investment adviser might become tempted
to continue recommending high risk projects solely with the pros-
pect of continued performance-based compensation.2" The rule
compensated for this threat by imposing numerous safeguards for
investor-advisees; the statute does not directly provide any such
protection. It appears, however, that Congress has vitiated the
former threat by allowing greater latitude to advisers, and thereby
reducing, if not totally removing, the incentive to engage in inten-
tional risk mismatch.
Congress also has removed the rule's requirement that the
business development company maintain a minimum holding of
five percent of the portfolio company's outstanding voting securi-
198. The definition of a business development company contained in the Advisers Act
permits the purchase of securities of otherwise eligible portfolio companies from any per-
son. See note 190 supra. So long as the investment group then provides "significant mana-
gerial assistance" to the issuer of the securities, the issuer may be counted toward the 60%
floor.
199. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
200. The 70% and 60% levels represent a compromise between the SEC and the busi-
ness development industry, but were not based on any empirical evidence. H.R. REP. No.
1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39 (1980).
201. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
202. This term is used by the House Report. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
38 (1980).
203. Id. at 39-40.
204. See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
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ties.2 °5 Instead, the statute requires the business development
company to "[make] available significant managerial assistance"
to the issuers of securities that it counts toward its sixty percent
floor.2 °6 The SEC had imposed the five percent holding require-
ment in order to achieve the same managerial effect, 20 7 apparently
on the grounds that a clear quantitative standard was the better
approach. Congress's action, however, will permit collaborative
efforts by several business development companies, none of which
would have met the SEC's five percent rule on its own.20 8 Al-
though interpretation of "significant managerial assistance" will,
presumably, impose some burden on the enforcement process, the
standard will permit increased cooperation between business de-
velopment groups and allow developing companies which are too
large for the resources of a single business development company
to benefit from facilitated capital formation and managerial assist-
ance.
20 9
The statute, unlike the rule, imposes no minimum investment
requirement on the investors of business development compa-
nies.210 Consequently, it will increase the pool of potential partici-
pants in these ventures, and thereby, the potential asset pool
available for investment in eligible portfolio companies. How-
ever, it also removes a potential, albeit very crude, safeguard
against investor risk mismatch. 21'
Through its definition of business development company,
Congress has expanded significantly the potential application of
business development company performance-based compensa-
tion. It is now lawful for a group of business development compa-
nies to pay their investment advisers performance-based
compensation, even though the companies are made up of inves-
205. See notes 115-20 supra and accompanying text.
206. See text of statutes at notes 190-91 supra.
207. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
209. One commentator on the proposed rule noted:
Perhaps the most myopic provision in the proposed rule is [the minimum 5%
holding]. The 5% test would effectively eliminate many venture capital firms
from innumerable, traditional venture capital investments. It would also serve to
concentrate economic and voting control of new and developing companies in the
hands of fewer investors to the detriment of the management of such enterprises
and would make it much more difficult for such entities to raise capital because of
an inability to spread the significant risk which such companies' securities repre-
sent.
Cooley, Godward letter, supra note 30, at 7-8.
210. See notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text.
211. See notes 169-77 supra and accompanying text.
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tors who have individually placed only small sums at risk, and
who maintain only sixty percent of their portfolios in the securi-
ties, purchased on the secondary market, of a single eligible port-
folio company. 2
2. "Eligible Portfolio Company"
Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company Act, added by the
1980 amendments,2"3 was incorporated into the Advisers Act
through the definition of a "business development company" in
section 202(a)(22).2 14 The new section defines an "eligible portfo-
lio company" in terms far broader than those contained in rule
205-3.215 Congress's definition does not require, as did the
SEC's,21 6 that the portfolio company be "small." Instead, an eligi-
ble portfolio company may be any domestic issuer of securities
which is not an investment company and which is: (a) controlled
212. It is possible for a group of business development companies to control an eligible
portfolio company. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477,
§ 101, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(46)). There is no longer a
requirement of a minimum investment. Indirect purchases of eligible portfolio company
securities may make up the entire 60% floor of a business development company for Advis-
ers Act purposes only. See text of statute at note 190 supra.
213. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 101, 94
Stat. 2275 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(46)). The Act provides:
"Eligible portfolio company" means any issuer which -
(A) is organized under the laws of, and has its principal place of business in, any State
or States;
(B) is neither an investment company as defined in section 3 (other than a small busi-
ness investment company which is licensed by the Small Business Administration to
operate under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 and which is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the business development company) nor a company which would be an in-
vestment company except for the exclusion from the definition of investment company in
section 3(c); and
(C) satisfies one of the following:
(i) it does not have any class of securities with respect to which a member of a
national securities exchange, broker, or dealer may extend or maintain credit to
or for a customer pursuant to rules or regulations adopted by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System under section 7 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934;
(ii) it is controlled by a business development company, either alone or as part
of a group acting together, and such business development company in fact exer-
cises a controlling influence over the management or policies of such eligible port-
folio company and, as a result of such control, has an affiliated person who is a
director of such eligible portfolio company; or
(iii) it meets such other criteria as the Commission may, by rule, establish as
consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes
fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this title.
Id.
214. See note 190 supra.
215. See note 129 supra.
216. See notes 134-39 supra and accompanying text.
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by a business development company or group of business devel-
opment companies acting together; (b) bankrupt or unable to meet
its obligations without assistance other than conventional lending
arrangement; (c) conforming to such other criteria as the SEC
may establish by rule.z"7
Unlike the rule," 8 the definition does not preclude all prior
public sales of the portfolio company's securities. With one excep-
tion, however, all of the qualifying securities must be purchased in
nonpublic offerings, unless the SEC rules otherwise.2" 9 The ex-
ception is for the securities of portfolio companies over which the
business development company has both actual and potential con-
trol, and on whose board the business development company has
an affiliated person serving as director z.2 2  Likewise, the statute
abandons the rule's limitation of the size of the portfolio com-
pany, and the result is further expansion of investment discretion
for the managers of the business development company's portfo-
lio; even the largest corporation can obtain the benefit of invest-
ments by business development companies which pay their
investment advisers performance-based compensation.221
The definition of eligible portfolio company so as to include
issuers which either are undergoing bankruptcy proceedings or are
unable to meet their current obligations without special assistance
is a significant change from rule 205-3. A large, publicly held cor-
poration-which under the rule could never have become an eligi-
ble portfolio company2 22 -can now become a qualifying issuer of
securities if it is in economic hard straits.223 Congress thus en-
217. Id.
218. See notes 140-43 supra and accompanying text.
219. These are "follow-on" transactions involving purchases of securities issued by eli-
gible portfolio companies which are controlled by the business development company, pur-
suant to § 55(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act, added by the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2278 (1980) (to be
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55(a)(2)). See H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1980).
220. Id.
221. For example, Investment group G, made up of business development companies
A, B, and C, controls eligible portfolio company T. T is a nonpublicly held company. T
goes public. B purchases additional shares in the market, either primary or secondary.
60% of B's portfolio is made up of T's securities. The remainder of B's portfolio is made up
of non-eligible securities. T's size is irrelevant, and B is still able to pay its investment
adviser performance-based compensation.
222. See note 134 supra.
223. Section 55(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, added by the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 105, 94 Stat. 2278 (1980) (to be
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55(a)(3)).
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courages the influx of capital not only to small and developing
companies, but also to companies in need of rehabilitation.224
Though a deviation from the rule's policy, this congressional
expansion of coverage is a logical extension of the performance-
based compensation concept. Companies which are insolvent are
normally unable either to borrow funds from conventional
financial intermediaries or to raise substantial capital in the gen-
eral securities market. These qualities are identical to those of
small and developing companies, and result from the same basic
problem: a high level of uncertainty about their future perform-
ance. 225 Insolvent companies, like small and developing compa-
nies, are high risk projects, and business development companies,
along with their investment advisers, specialize in such high risk
projects.226 The ability to select likely targets for successful reha-
bilitation is a talent similar to that employed in the selection of
small and developing firms; likewise, the extra managerial efforts
in business development are equally useful to developing or reha-
bilitating companies. Thus, extension of performance-based com-
pensation to the investment advisers of those business
development companies which purchase securities of insolvent or
reorganizing firms serves the same policies which support the pay-
ment of performance-based compensation when small and devel-
oping companies are benefited.
This expansion of eligibility, however, may create a loophole
in the statutory scheme. The statute, like the rule, excludes invest-
ment companies from eligibility,227 but it is possible to interpret
the statute, as enacted, so as to allow eligibility to an insolvent
investment company.228 If this interpretation were applied, it
224. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1980).
225. See notes 40-51 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
227. See note 213 supra.
228. Section 55(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for a business development company to acquire any
assets (other than those described in paragraphs (I) through (7) of this subsection)
unless, at the time the acquisition is made, assets described in paragraphs (1)
through (6) below represent at least 70 per centum of the value of its total assets
(other than assets described in paragraph (7) below):
(3)Securities purchased in transactions not involving any public offering from
an issuer described in sections 2(a)(46)(4) and (B) [see text of section at note 213
supra] orfrom aperson who i, or who within theprceding thirteen months has been,
an affiliated person of such issuer, or from any person in transactions incident
thereto, if such securities were -
(A) issued by an issuer that is, or was immediately prior to the purchases of its
securities by the business development company, in bankruptcy proceedings, sub-
ject to reorganization under the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction,
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would be possible for a business development company to
purchase the securities of an investment company-albeit a reha-
bilitating one-and still qualify its own investment adviser for
performance-based compensation. This presents a potential for
abuse.2
29
Nevertheless, if this loophole exists, it may be tolerable. The
insolvency of an investment company may discourage further pri-
vate capital investment of this type, which could result in a reduc-
tion in capital formation. The statute's "loophole", which could
allow a business development company to "rescue" a failing in-
vestment company, may counteract this negative effect.
B. Protection of Investors
Rule 205-3 provided numerous safeguards to investor-ad-
visees against both investment mismatch by the individual inves-
tor and abuse of power by the investment adviser who receives
performance-based compensation.230 The SEC was compelled by
section 206A to make certain that it was not reducing the level of
protection previously offered to investor-advisees.231 Although
Congress was not bound by the same standard, it stated that -it
"intended to preserve to the fullest possible extent these types of
or subject to a plan or arrangement resulting from such bankruptcy proceedings
or reorganization;
(B) issued by an issuer pursuant to or in consummation of such a plan or
arrangement; or
(C) issued by an issuer that, immediately prior to the purchase of such issuer's
securities by the business development company, was not in bankruptcy proceed-
ings but was unable to meet its obligations as they came due without material
assistance other than conventional lending or financing arrangement.
Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2479 (1980) (emphasis added). The definition of business
development company for purposes of the Advisers Act modifies this section in two ways:
(1) by lowering the 70% floor to 60%; and (2) by permitting the purchase of securities from
any person. See note 190 supra.
It is possible to interpret subsection (C) of the business development company defini-
tion - "the securities which may be purchased pursuant to section 55(a) of title I of this
Act may be purchased from any person" - to mean that "from any person" is to be substi-
tuted for the emphasized portion of§ 55(a)(3). If this is the case, there would no longer be
a direct link between § 55(a)(3) and § 2(a)(46)(B), which is the prohibition against invest-
ment companies becoming eligible portfolio companies.
An argument can be made that "from any person" must instead be read to be in addi-
tion to the emphasized words, and modified by their effect. In this case, the link to
§ 2(a)(46)(B) would remain, and insolvent investment companies would be ineligible for
business development company investment, at least for performance-based compensation
purposes.
229. See notes 144-45 supra and accompanying text.
230. See notes 153-58 supra and accompanying text.
231. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
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protections. 2 32 The 1980 amendments, however, may result in a
significant weakening of investor safeguards, a weakening that
could have been avoided while still obtaining the desired benefits.
Congress has abandoned the rule's requirements for investor
knowledgeability, 233 investor access to material information, 234
minimum investment by investors, 235 and minimum investment
by the investment adviser.236 Yet, each of these had, under the
rule, contributed substantially to investor protections against both
abuse of power by the investment adviser and individual invest-
ment mismatch. Congress's failure to provide for knowledge-
ability and access to material information requirements are the
most significant weaknesses of the 1980 amendments. As noted,
performance-based compensation is permitted for investment ad-
visers to business development companies in order to attract more
such advisers.237 The increased participation of such advisers is
expected to lead to increased capital formation for high risk enter-
prises such as small, developing, and insolvent companies. 38 In
turn, this should lead to an increase in the numbers of investors
engaging in high risk investments. Yet, unlike the rule, the statute
provides no explicit protection for unwary investor-advisees for
whom such high risk undertakings are inappropriate. Further-
more, the statute does not contain the rule's protections against an
adviser engaging in intentional risk mismatches in order to con-
tinue the payments of performance-based compensation.239
Rule 205-3 required that the investor-advisee possess a mini-
mum level of financial and investment "sophistication": both the
ability to formulate insightful questions concerning the risk and
valuation of the investment package, the business development
company, and the investment adviser, and the ability to compel
full and complete answers to these questions.24 ° Congress has rec-
ognized the worth of requiring sophisticated investors in circum-
232. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980).
233. See notes 159-63 supra and accompanying text.
234. See notes 164-68 supra and accompanying text.
235. See notes 169-77 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 178-82 supra and accompanying text.
237. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
238. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., note 179 supra and accompanying text. Congress's broad definition of
business development company may, however, vitiate this threat. See notes 204-05 supra
and accompanying text.
240. R. COFFEY, SECURITIes REGULATION 414a (1978) (unpublished text in Case
Western Reserve University Law School Library); see note 159 supra and accompanying
text.
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stances where the risk of investment is an unknown quantity.24' It
seems anomalous, however, to require a high degree of sophistica-
tion in circumstances where the risk factor may be either low or
high but not to require such sophistication where it is absolutely
certain that the risk factor will be high. The opportunity for large-
scale mismatching of investors with risk, avoided under rule
205-3, appears quite probable under the statute.
242
This result need not have been reached by Congress. Cer-
tainly, requiring the business development company to limit its
investor group to sophisticated persons alone would severely limit
the initial pool of eligible investors. However, by following the
scheme of rule 205-3, which allowed investment by any persons
acting under the guidance of sophisticated advisers,243 the amount
of capital available would have been significantly increased, while
the problems of risk mismatch would still be avoided.
Similarly, the failure of Congress to require the investor to
have access to material information seriously weakens the ability
of investors to protect themselves; changes in the portfolio's "mix"
of securities could also alter the risk and return factors upon
which the original investment decisions were made. Yet without
access to the material information about this "mix", the investor
would be unaware of the risk and return alternatives, and would
continue the investment. The resulting risk preference mis-
matching could lead to decline in the numbers of investors willing
to engage in business development activities. 2" Clearly, this re-
241. The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 was passed with an amend-
ment containing the Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-477, 94 Stat. 2294 (1980). The latter contains an amendment to the Securities Act of
1933 defining the term "accredited investor" to include any person "who, on the basis of
such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial
matters, or amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited investor under
rules and regulations which the Commission shall prescribe." This represents a codifica-
tion of Rule 242, 45 Fed. Reg. 6367 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 230.242).
242. A hypothetical business development company could be made up of investors on
fixed incomes, who invest their life savings (perhaps leveraged) in the business develop-
ment company after being persuaded to do so by the investment adviser (albeit without
fraud on the latter's part). The investment adviser would counsel acquisition of a portfolio
which would qualify him or her for performance-based compensation, in hopes of suffi-
cient success in the overall investment to yield the adviser a large fee. Yet the inherent
high risk (high variance of returns) could result in a total loss.
This example represents a case of total risk mismatch. The investors should be risk
averse, and investing in securities with lower variance as to return.
243. See rule 205-3(b)(4)(ii), supra note 20, at 44,113-3.
244. This observation makes the behavioral assumption that investors who lose their
investment once will be wary of returning to the same type of transaction for fear of losing
twice. It also assumes that eventual public exposure of the high risk factor combined with
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sult could be avoided by requiring disclosure of material informa-
tion, but Congress has declined to do so.
C. The Amount of Allowable Compensation
Congress has amended section 205 of the Advisers Act to per-
mit the payment of performance-based compensation to invest-
ment advisers who serve business development companies. 45 The
level of compensation allowed is limited to twenty percent of the
realized gains of the business development company over a period
not to exceed one year, and must be calculated net of both realized
capital losses and unrealized capital depreciation. The twenty
percent level of compensation is more restrictive than the compen-
sation allowed under rule 205-3, which had no ceiling. The rule
also permitted the inclusion of unrealized capital gains, which is
not allowed by the statute.2
46
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the modification of section 205 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to permit the payment of per-
formance-based compensation to investment advisers working for
business development companies-in light of the dual objectives
of increasing the flow of capital to small, developing, and insol-
vent companies while maintaining adequate safeguards for the in-
vestor.2 47 The SEC and Congress have determined that increased
capital formation for small businesses can be facilitated by a grant
of exemption from the prohibition contained in section 205
against performance-based compensation to investment advisers
of business development companies,248 since these companies are
concerned primarily with the active investment in and manage-
ment of high risk companies unable to finance their activities
through conventional financial intermediaries. 9 It is believed
that the exemption from section 205 will facilitate the efforts of
a record of losses suffered by poor candidates for high risk investments would lead to pub-
lic distain for business development company activities. An alternative result would be a
public determination that the statutory protections against the "frauds and misrepresenta-
tions of tipsters and touts" have been weakened too much, leading to modification of the
statute.
245. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 203, 94
Stat. 2290 (1980) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(C)).
246. See notes 183-87 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 1-32 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 24-32 supra and accompanying text.
249. See notes 21-22 and 40-52 supra and accompanying text.
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these companies, and thereby increase the quality and quantity of
investment in small companies.
The SEC limited the application of rule 205-3 to business de-
velopment companies likely to satisfy the needs for additional
capital resources of small businesses by means of requirements
concerning the size of the eligible portfolio company,25 ° the non-
public nature of the portfolio securities,25' the necessity of direct
acquisition of the securities, 25 2 and the necessity for the business
development company's continued status of holder of small and
developing company securities.253 In contrast, Congress has ex-
panded the category of eligible portfolio securities to include in-
solvent firms and large companies. 4
The SEC sought to protect the investors in the business devel-
opment companies with the requirement of investor knowledge-
ability,255 investor access to material information, 256 minimum
investment requirements for both investor and adviser,257 and per-
formance-based compensation calculations using a netting process
of all losses as well as any gains.2  Congress has omitted all of
these protective devices except the last;259 it modified the netting
process to be exclusive of unrealized gains.
260
Rule 205-3 as written served the essential purposes of the Ad-
visers Act while giving assistance to the small businesses which
form a crucial sector of the American economy. Several modifica-
tions would have strengthened the proposed regulation. First, the
SEC should have adopted its alternate definition of portfolio com-
pany size to increase the certainty that investments would flow
only to the small and developing companies it targeted for assist-
ance.26' Second, for added investor protection, a positive burden
of disclosure of material information should have been imposed
upon the investment adviser, and the burden of inquiry placed on
the investor under the proposed rule should have been rejected.262
250. See notes 134-39 supra and accompanying text.
251. See notes 140-43 supra and accompanying text.
252. See notes 93-105 supra and accompanying text.
253. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
254. See notes 221-28 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 159-63 supra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 164-68 supra and accompanying text.
257. See notes 169-82 supra and accompanying text.
258. See notes 183-87 supra and accompanying text.
259. See notes 232-43 supra and accompanying text.
260. See notes 244-45 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 138-39 supra and accompanying text.
262. See notes 168-69 supra and accompanying text.
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Third, in addition. to the rule's requirement of a minimum invest-
ment by all investors, all investors in business development com-
panies should have been required to be capable of bearing the
economic risk of their investment.263 These modifications would
have increased the proposed rule's protection of investors and the
certainty of investment by business development companies in
small and developing companies.
Congress's amendments to the Advisers Act contained in the
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 fail to provide
the protection needed by investors in the high risk investments
represented by business development companies. 264 Such protec-
tion was offered by the SEC in its proposed rule, and it could be
added to the statutory language without significantly reducing the
benefits of additional capital formation for small, developing, and
insolvent companies. Such modification would return the protec-
tions previously existing under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940.
DAVID P. PORTER
263. See notes 172-77 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 232-43 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 30:676
